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Abstract 
The noise surrounding the disclosure of oil and gas reserves 
Liliana Filipa Rodrigues de Barros 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the noise surrounding the disclosure of oil and gas 
reserves size on the annual reports, thus it evaluates if the oil and gas companies are 
underestimating or overestimating their reported reserves.  
Actually, this thesis also has an important role as SEC recently reviewed SFAS 69. Therefore, 
it addresses a currently debate about the best reporting practices of oil and gas reserves. 
By analyzing the modifications made to SFAS 69, we notice that even with the modernization 
of rules, they still allow noise in oil and gas reserves reporting. In the oil industry, disclosed 
information has large implications on companies’ results and the current accounting rule is 
not enough of an incentive for companies to report the actual reserves they own. 
To study this subject, we chose a sample of 25 top oil and gas companies and analyze their oil 
and gas reserves reported. It demonstrated that the total oil and gas reported reserves by the 
25 top companies, is smaller than the world total estimated oil and gas reserves, which means, 
it only match 7% of world total oil reserves and 15% of world total gas reserves. Since it is an 
industry that has high level of geographic concentration of resources, in other words, small 
number of companies in a small number of countries controls most of the oil and gas reserves, 
we conclude that the majority of companies is underestimating their oil and gas reserves. 
 
Resumo 
Esta tese tem como objetivo analisar o ruído do volume das reservas de petróleo e gás 
publicado nos relatórios de contas anuais, logo avalia se as empresas de petróleo e gás estão a 
subestimar ou a sobrestimar as suas reservas publicadas.  
Na realidade, esta tese desempenha também um importante papel visto que a SEC reviu 
recentemente a SFAS 69. Por conseguinte, foca uma discussão atual relativamente às 
melhores práticas de reporte das reservas de petróleo e gás. 
Ao analisar as alterações feitas à SFAS 69, notamos que mesmo ao modernizarem as regras, 
ainda continua a ser permitido ruído no reporte das reservas de petróleo e gás. Na indústria do 
petróleo, a informação publicada tem grandes implicações nos resultados das empresas e as 
atuais regras contabilísticas não são um suficiente incentivo para que as empresas reportem as 
reservas que de facto possuem. 
Para estudar este tema, escolhemos uma amostra de 25 empresas líderes de petróleo e gás e 
analisámos as suas reservas de petróleo e gás publicadas. Demonstrou-se que o total das 
reservas de petróleo e gás publicado pelas 25 empresas líderes é menor do que o total de 
reservas de petróleo e gás mundial estimado, ou seja, apenas corresponde a 7% do total de 
reservas de petróleo mundiais e 15% do total de reservas de gás mundiais. Uma vez que se 
trata de uma indústria com elevado nível de concentração geográfico, ou seja, um pequeno 
número de empresas em poucos países controla a maioria das reservas de petróleo e gás, 
concluímos que a maioria das empresas está a subestimar as suas reservas de petróleo e gás. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Oil and natural gas are nonrenewable natural resources and the main world source of energy. 
It is probably the industry that is more closely followed in the world, as is evidenced by the 
attention given to the price of the oil barrel. The oil and gas industry is characterized for 
requiring huge investments and having a large geographic concentration of resources. This 
means that a small number of companies in a small number of countries controls most of the 
oil and gas reserves. Along with the known geo-political implications, this fact also has 
notorious economic implications.  
In order to address some of these implications, publically listed firms in the US are bound to 
report the size of their reserves on the annual reports. However, we claim that these values are 
subject to noise. The purpose of this dissertation is to document the noise surrounding the 
disclosure of these reserves. 
Hence, we analyze the reserve disclosures of the top oil and gas companies in the world1. The 
reporting of these reserves is regulated by accounting rules, which are enforced by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
69 (SFAS 69) is the accounting rule that regulates the disclosure of oil and gas reserves. 
SFAS 69 was originally issued in 1982 and since then it has been altered many times. The 
cause for this rule’s evolution lies mainly on the fact that there is a lot of controversy not only 
surrounding disclosure requirements but also on the definitions of major concepts the rule 
involves and on the exact determination of oil and gas reserves. In this thesis, this controversy 
will be documented and the recent evolution of SFAS 69 will be described. 
This dissertation also searches for evidence of the Peak Oil Theory in the reserves’ 
disclosures of the main world oil companies. Peak oil is a theory based on the Hubbert2 bell-
shaped production curve, in which a production rate growing exponentially over time is 
                                                           
1
 We used Platts Top 250 Global Energy Company Rankings to select these companies. Platts is a division of 
McGraw-Hill Companies and is a provider of energy information well respected in the industry. (site available at 
http://www.platts.com/Top250Home.aspx)  
2
 See Hubbert, M. K., Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels 'Drilling and Production Practice', pp. 22–27, June 
1956 . Available at http://www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/1956/1956.pdf  
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represented, until it reaches the maximum point, that is, until the highest rate of oil extraction 
is reached – the peak oil. Then, it starts to decrease, only stopping when the field is depleted. 
Some authors, for instance Morris Adelman3, question the theory that states that oil reserves 
are running out. Yet others, for example Christophe de Margerie4 (CEO of Total), argue that 
oil output is close to the peak, and claim that the recent escalade in the oil price (with the 
barrel reaching $143.95 on the Europe market in July 2008) can be seen as evidence that the 
world is running out of oil. Evidence of Peak Oil would be related to how the value of the 
reported reserves by the companies compares to the estimations available from several energy 
agencies and also to the discussion on how the reserves change from year to year. The annual 
variation of the reserves can be explained by the depletion caused by exploitation but also by 
several other dimensions, such as: adjustments, revisions (increases and decreases), sales, 
acquisitions, extensions, new field discoveries, new reservoir in old fields and estimated 
production5. Nevertheless, the purpose of the thesis is not prove the economic existence or not 
of peak oil, it is just an analysis of modifications made recently in SFAS69, describing how 
the rule may or may not help shed some light on where we stand with respect to increases and 
decreases in oil reserves. 
Despite the fact that accounting rules are ever improving by trying to offer better definitions 
and disclosures requirements, the disclosure of oil and gas reserves still lacks verifiability. 
The existing rules allow for a substantial amount of noise in reserves reporting. One must 
notice that under U.S. standards – SFAS 69 – the reserves numbers are based on estimations, 
these estimates not are audited, no review of reserves estimates is required, nor are these 
numbers required to be prepared by an independent engineer. Canadian rules (National 
Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities), on the other hand, 
require a report by an independent qualified evaluator or auditor for the non-exempt 
companies (Schlumberger, 2003). 
                                                           
3
 See Adelman, Morris A., The Real Oil Problem. Regulation, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 16-21, Spring 2004. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=545042, where he states: “It is commonly asked, when will the world’s supply 
of oil be exhausted? The best one-word answer: Never”  
4
 FT.com, Total says oil output near peak, By Carola Hoyos in London, Published: February 15 2009. Available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d25b8d2c-fb97-11dd-bcad-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1  
5
 See Energy Information Administration, U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves 2007 
Annual Report, chapter 3 – Crude Oil Statistics  
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Finally, to conclude the goals of this thesis, using the analysis provided by the aforementioned 
objectives, we aim to illustrate what kind of incentives do oil and gas companies have for 
reporting reserves that they actually own.  
Therefore, in summary, the research questions are: 
 
1. What are the incentives of oil companies for overestimating or underestimating their 
reserves? 
2. How does SFAS 69 allow for noise in valuation of reserves reporting? 
3. How have the concepts used to estimate oil and gas reserves changed in the recent 
SFAS 69 review? 
4. What lacks to be able to calculate the world oil and gas reserves through the sum of 
reserves reported by top oil and gas companies? 
5. Is the new version of SFAS 69 capable of addressing some of these problems? 
 
This thesis makes a relevant contribution, as SFAS 69 was just recently revised and the new 
version was effective since January 2010. Hence this study can be viewed as being part of an 
ongoing discussion on the best reporting practices in the topic of oil and gas reserves.  
SFAS 69 deals with many controversial concepts and definitions. The recent revision 
triggered more than 140 comments  (Release No. 33-8870; File No. S7-29-07 and Release 
No. 33-8935; File No. S7-15-08) from several agents in the industry contesting issues such as 
the definition and usage of proved reserves, proved developed reserves, producing reserves, 
non-producing reserves, proved undeveloped reserves, unproved reserves, probable reserves, 
possible reserves, among many other concepts, to name a few. The informational implications 
of the different definitions, as viewed in the different comments, are documented here and 
certainly constitute an original and relevant contribution to the accounting literature. The most 
relevant information provided by the companies, in accordance with this rule, is related to the 
proved oil and gas reserve quantities and to the capitalized costs associated with oil and gas 
producing activities. Capitalized costs represent the aggregate amount of expenditures on 
proved and unproved oil and gas properties and related accumulated depreciation, depletion 
and amortization, and valuation allowances.  
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Furthermore, we also aim to frame these tensions and discussions in the economic theory, 
namely using the Hotelling principle. This principle is based on the analysis of non-renewable 
resources’ management. According to the Hotelling's (1931) "Economics of Exhaustible 
Resources"6, in order to exploit efficiently and maximize the resource capital’s present value, 
the equality between the percentage variation in net price per unit of time and the discount 
rate should be assured.  
The fact that the accounting rule leaves some room for companies to misrepresent their 
reserves along with the possibility of the Peak Oil theory actually being true - which makes 
the running out of oil imminent and amplifies the problems anticipated by the Hotelling 
hypothesis - implies that the conditions are met and, therefore, the misrepresentation may 
have real economic implications and distort market equilibrium. 
When analyzing the oil and gas reserves reported by 25 top companies, we suggest that 
companies are underestimating their oil and gas reserves since the sum of their total oil and 
gas reserves only represents 7% of world total oil reserves and 15% world total gas reserves. 
However, there is a lack of information on Middle East reserves which makes it impossible to 
take accurate conclusions. Hence, Middle East oil and gas companies do not provide the 
information of their reserves and the 25 top oil and gas companies do not separate their 
Middle East reserves from the others. Therefore, it is important to notice that not having 
available the Middle East reserves, as they represent approximately 50% of world total oil 
reserves and around 40% of world total gas reserves7 (accordingly to the world total estimates 
in 2011), is a huge barrier to this analysis, which undermines any rigorous conclusion. 
The organization of the thesis is as follows. In the next chapter, the concepts used and the rule 
which defines requirement disclosure in reporting oil and gas are explained. In addition to 
that, the Hotelling Principle is also described and as well as how to determine the valuation of 
oil and gas reserves. Chapter 3 discusses the problems behind the information required for oil 
and gas companies and reflects on the update made to the current rule, which is intended to 
better represent the current practices followed by the industry and somehow help overcoming 
                                                           
6
 See Hotelling, H., The economics of exhaustible resources, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 
137-175, April 1931. Available at SSRN: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1822328  
7
 See BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy
_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.pdf 
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those problems. Chapter 4 sets out the calculation of total oil and gas reserves reported 
annually, by 25 top oil and gas companies across nine years, in order to compare the report 
with the total estimation of oil and gas reserves in the world (in volume). Chapter 5 presents 
the results obtained in the previous chapter by stating which incentives companies have for 
underestimating or overestimating their oil and gas reserves. In addition, the differences 
between capitalized costs and barrels times the price will be analyzed. The final chapter 
summarizes the analysis, presents some criticisms to the new financial accounting standards, 
provides some possible future consequences and identifies the scope for further topics. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Oil and Gas Reserves Definitions 
When analyzing the industry, we notice that there are several terms used to describe oil and 
gas reserves. However, there is no consensus8 about these definition across the world. Thus, 
depending on the term used, we have distinct volumes and prices, consequently different 
values of reserves.  
The two most important set of definitions were developed by different organizations:  
• Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1978 - these definitions9 should be 
used by all publicly owned U.S. listed oil companies issuing securities, when 
disclosing their reserves and were designed to produce conservative reports;  
• Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and the World Petroleum Congresses (WPC) in 
1997 - their goal was to launch a worldwide single approach10.  
There are more definitions which were established by other organizations, such as the 
Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum11 (CIM) (Schlumberger, 2003). 
Since most of the top oil and gas companies as defined in the Platts12 ranking are listed in U. 
S. stock market, they have to follow the SEC’s rules. Therefore, SEC definitions are the focal 
point of this study. Nevertheless, we will also pay attention to other terms which are not 
                                                           
8
 See SPE, Comparison of Selected Reserves and Resource Classifications and Associated Definitions, 
December 2005. Available at 
http://www.aboutoilandgas.org/industry/reserves/docs/OGR_Mapping_Final_Report.pdf  
9
 Available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfactfaq.htm#P279_57537  
10
 Available at http://www.spe.org/industry/reserves/docs/Petroleum_Reserves_Definitions_1997.pdf  
11
 See Schlumberger, Oil and Gas Reserves Disclosure White Paper, October 2003. Available at 
http://www.slb.com/media/services/software/whitepaper/whitepaper_oilgasreserve.pdf  
12
 Platts (2008). Available at www.platts.com/top250/index.xml  
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approved for use in SEC fillings but are typically used in the industry, which are detailed in 
table 2.1. 
Firstly, we shall focus on definitions used for proved, proved developed and proved 
undeveloped oil and gas reserves which are in accordance with the applicable U.S. SEC 
regulation, Rule 4.10 of Regulation S-X. 
SEC definitions of oil and gas reserves were created in 1978 and since then they have become 
the standard in the industry for reporting purposes. When these definitions were established, it 
was a time of relatively stable prices, a time with long term gas contracts and the definitions 
have a clear U.S. domestic mindset. It is very important to notice that oil and gas companies 
which follow the SEC rules are only mandated to disclose proved reserves.  
Rule 4.10 of Regulation S-X defines proved oil and gas reserves as “the estimated quantities of 
crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids which geological and engineering data demonstrate with 
reasonable certainty to be recoverable in future years from known reservoirs under existing economic and 
operating conditions, i.e. prices and costs as of the date the estimate is made. Prices include consideration of 
changes in existing prices provided only by contractual arrangements, but not on escalations based upon future 
conditions” (Rule 4.10, 1975). As estimation of oil and gas reserves involves subjective 
judgments, they cannot be measured exactly and consequently are subject to revisions.  
Proved reserves can be categorized as either proved developed reserves or proved 
undeveloped reserves. Proved developed reserves are “those reserves that can be expected to be 
recovered through existing wells with existing equipment and operating methods” (Rule 4.10, 1975). 
Proved undeveloped reserves (PUD’s) are “those reserves that are expected to be recovered from new 
wells on un-drilled acreage, or from existing wells where a relatively major expenditure is required for 
recompletion” (Rule 4.10, 1975). The difference between these terms is whether the major part 
of the investment required to produce and sell the oil and gas has already been made or not, 
i.e. if the wells have been drilled or not. 
On the other hand, the definitions of the Society of Petroleum Engineers - World Petroleum 
Congresses (SPE-WPC) are the ones commonly used in oil and gas industry for decision 
making purposes, especially when managers need to decide on capital investments, but also 
they are more informative for investors when it comes to potential ultimate recovery of oil 
and gas (see Chevron’s 2007 Annual Report, pp 28). 
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According to the SPE-WPC, reserves are divided into two main classifications: proved and 
unproved, depending on their relative degree of uncertainty. Proved reserves can be 
considered developed or undeveloped reserves similarly to what was already mentioned for 
the SEC definitions. Additionally, in contrast with SEC, these reserves can also be subdivided 
into producing (“expected to be recovered from completion intervals which are open and producing at the 
time of the estimate” (SPE, 1997)) and non-producing (include shut-in and behind-pipe reserves). 
Unproved reserves are “based on geologic and/or engineering data similar to that used in estimates of 
proved reserves; but technical, contractual, economic, or regulatory uncertainties preclude such reserves being 
classified as proved” (SPE, 1997). In conformity with the relative degree of uncertainty about 
reserves existence they can be classified as probable or possible. 
On one hand, probable reserves are “those unproved reserves which analysis of geological and 
engineering data suggests are more likely than not to be recoverable … when probabilistic methods are used, 
there should be at least a 50% probability that the quantities actually recovered will equal or exceed the sum of 
estimated proved plus probable reserves” (SPE, 1997). On the other hand, possible reserves are 
“those unproved reserves which analysis of geological and engineering data suggests are less likely to be 
recoverable than probable reserves … when probabilistic methods are used, there should be at least a 10% 
probability that the quantities actually recovered will equal or exceed the sum of estimated proved plus probable 
plus possible reserves” (SPE, 1997). Neither one of the terms is recognized by SEC. 
The meaning of these terms is so controversial among investors, analysts, managers and the 
press that they can even result in different values of oil and gas reserves13 (Harrel). There are 
several definitions to categorize oil and gas reserves. Therefore, one well after being studied 
and drilled can have a quantity of oil that is considered a commercially viable discovery and 
that can be enough to start a development plan completely different depending on the reserves 
definitions that are considered valid. For instance, an evaluator can conclude there are 100 
million barrels of proved oil (SPE-WPC 1997), or 50 million barrels of proved oil (SEC 1978) 
assuming “lowest known oil” as a conservative approach, or even zero (CIM 2002) if the 
reservoir was not flow tested. Because of that the SEC is addressing these definitions in the 
revision process of the standard in order to remove ambiguities.  
In the annual reports of top oil and gas companies in the world, which we will analyze later, 
the quantities of oil and gas proved reserves disclosed in the unaudited supplementary 
                                                           
13
 See Harrell, R. (2008). Whose reserves estimates can I trust?. World Energy Magazine, 7(1). Available at 
http://www.worldenergysource.com/articles/text/harrell_WE_v7n1.cfm  
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schedules refer to the definition of proved reserves in Rule 4.10/SEC. Consequently, this will 
be the key definition in this dissertation.  
 
2.2 Financial Accounting Standards 
According to Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), if the analysis focuses on oil and 
gas reserves, the statement that regulates this subject is the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 69 – Disclosures about Oil and Gas Producing Activities. This statement 
became effective for fiscal years starting December 15th, 1982. As reported in SFAS 69, 
publicly traded enterprises, that have significant oil and gas producing activities, must 
disclose as supplementary information in their annual financial statements: proved oil and gas 
reserve quantities; capitalized costs relating to oil and gas producing activities; cost incurred 
in oil and gas property acquisition, exploration, and development activities; results of 
operations for oil and gas producing activities; and a standardized measure of discounted 
future net cash flows relating to proved oil and gas reserve quantities (paragraph 7 of FASB, 
1982).  
When it comes to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) these do not provide 
any exact regulation for oils and gas reserves disclosures. 
In order to understand the values reported by oil and gas companies, the center of our 
attention will be the disclosure of proved oil and gas reserve quantities, capitalized costs 
relating to oil and gas producing activities and a standardized measure of discounted future 
net cash flows relating to proved oil and gas reserve quantities (in the next subchapter). 
 
2.2.1 Proved oil and gas reserve quantities  
Firstly, disclosure of proved oil and gas reserves quantities refers to disclosure of the 
beginning and the end of the year of net quantities of crude oil, condensate and natural gas 
liquids and natural gas (exclude royalties and interests owned by others). 
Secondly, the changes of proved oil and gas reserve net quantities that occur during the year 
should be also disclosed. Additions of proved reserves can be a result of purchases of mineral 
in place, extensions (of the proved acreage of previously discovered old reservoirs) and 
10 
 
discoveries of new fields or of new reservoirs in old fields. Extraction, production or sales of 
minerals in place will decrease the proved oil and gas reserves. Other type of changes due to 
revisions and reclassifications of previously estimated values or due to the usage of improved 
recovery techniques can increase or decrease the proved reserves. 
Thirdly, proved oil and gas reserves shall be disclosed according to where they are located. In 
other words, if companies only have reserves in their home country they must reveal that fact, 
but if, on the contrary, they have reserves in several oil fields across the world, they must 
segment the significant reserves they own according to foreign geographic area, which can be 
single or groups of countries. 
Finally, the unit in which reserves quantities are published in is very important. Therefore, 
companies must publish oil and natural gas liquids reserves in barrels and gas reserves in 
cubic feet. 
The decision-making process in oil and gas companies is influenced by the impact of 
information about changes in proved oil and gas reserves, mainly due to the discoveries of 
reserves, as it is a key element of company success.  
 
2.2.2. Capitalized costs relating to oil and gas producing activities 
Capitalized costs are all costs associated to oil and gas producing activities, such as cost of 
equipment and facilities, cost of exploratory and development wells. Capitalized costs also 
include cost of leaseholds that companies have to pay to countries for allowing the 
exploration and drilling properties which are owned by countries. Additionally, the costs are 
capitalized when it is demonstrated that the oil and gas producing activities will generate 
future economic benefits. 
When exploration of wells begins, all costs associated are capitalized. Once exploratory 
drilling activities are finished, the information is already available to determine whether 
proved reserves were found or not and, as a consequence, if costs remain capitalized or 
expensed. Thus, if proved reserves were found, all costs will stay capitalized and are subject 
to depreciation or depletion. If it is determined that there is no proved reserves, previously 
capitalized costs related to exploratory wells will be expensed in the year of determination 
(Occidental’s Annual Report 2005).  
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According to SFAS 69, at the end of the year, the aggregate related accumulated depreciation, 
depletion, amortization and valuation allowances referring to the capitalized costs must be 
disclosed along with the capitalized costs. In addition, capitalized costs of unproved 
properties shall be disclosed individually, if they are significant. Investors benefit from this 
distinction, because it is easier to notice the degree of risk related to proved and unproved 
properties, which is higher in the latter. Another advantage of making this separation is the 
fact that investors can become aware of the company’s holdings in properties, which can 
result in increased rising oil and gas production . 
To conclude, the disclosures required by SFAS 69 are hugely important for understanding oil 
and gas producing activities. On the one hand, they emphasize the oil and gas reserves 
magnitude as an economic resource and the risks associated to geographic location of oil and 
gas producing activities. On the other, they are useful to recognize the reasonably long cycle 
from resource exploration to production, product sale and ultimate cash flow.  
 
2.3 Oil and Gas Valuation 
The valuation of oil and gas reserves is a very important factor in reputation and image of 
enterprises in this industry. 
SEC Rule 4-10 of Regulation S-X required disclosure of “a Standardized Measure of Discounted 
Future Net Cash Flows relating to proved oil and gas reserve quantities” which shall be reported both in 
a value aggregating all reserves and also in segmented values by geographic area. According 
to the SEC, the valuation of oil and gas reserves should be based on economic, environmental 
and operating conditions existing at year end using, consequently, the year-end spot price for 
the barrel of oil, which means that reserves are valued on the last reporting day of the year – 
usually the 31th of December. For instance, in Total’s annual report for 2007, which follows 
SEC requirements, we can confirm that their reserves were determined based on the Brent 
price of 31 December 2007 ($93.72/barrel). This was also the reference price used for the 
future cash inflows estimates. 
When this rule was originally created, it was a time of stable petroleum prices, so it makes 
sense valuing oil and gas reserves at year-end-price as the variation across the year was very 
low. However, more recently, there has been high fluctuation in Brent price, for instance, in 
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2007 the Brent price began at $58.49/barrel and closed the year at $93.68/barrel, it reached 
$143.95 in July 2008 and in 2011 the year-end price was $108.09/barrel (U. S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2011).  
In order to determine “A Standardized Measure of Discounted Future Net Cash Flows relating 
to proved oil and gas reserve quantities”, the difference between the “Future Cash Inflows” 
and the sum of “Future Development and Production Costs” and “Future Income Tax 
Expenses” shall be calculated. “Future Development and Production Costs” refers to the 
estimation of expenditures (based on year-end cost indicators) related to year-end oil and gas 
proved reserves’ development and production and “Future Income Tax Expenses” results 
from statutory tax rates (adjusted for tax deductions). Then, it is subtracted the “Discount” 
which is the amount resulted from using a 10 annual percentage discount rate, according with 
the estimated timing of cash flows. The anticipation of how many years the reserves will last 
is related to the life expectancy of reserves. Assuming that the production rate will keep 
approximately the same in future years, the division between total volume of proved reserves 
at year-end and the quantity extracted in that year results in determination of reserves life 
expectancy14. 
To conclude, it is important to clarify that SEC adopted the standardized measure described 
above for the valuation of oil and gas reserves, preferring a conservative approach rather than 
the use of fair market value. 
 
2.4 Theoretical Background – Hotelling Principle 
Since the beginning of 20th century, the concern about rapid extraction of oil and the fear of 
running out of oil has been installed in the world. Oil is a non-renewable resource and it is 
nowadays the world’s most important energy source. 
In 1931, Harold Hotelling wrote a paper named “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources”, 
in which he analyzed how to manage the exploration of non-renewable resources. The 
                                                           
14
 See Environmental Accounts branch – Office for National Statistics, The valuation of oil and gas reserves, 
1999. Available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/ceea/archive/Energy/UK_Oil%20and%20gas%20reserves%20valuation
.PDF  
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Hotelling’s Principle is explained in this paper and it defines the rule for efficient exploitation 
of non-renewable resources over time – the growth’s percentage of price should equal the 
discount rate. In other words, the difference between the price of a non-renewable resource 
and the marginal extraction cost will increase over time at the rate of interest (the rate of 
return on comparable assets). This allows for the maximization of the present value of 
resources during the extraction period. This economic principle supports the analysis. Hence, 
as oil is limited, its production diminishes as available reserves deplete, which implies a 
contraction of the supply curve. The price will increase and, consequently, demand will 
decrease. The situation described according to Hotelling’s Principle is in fact aligned with the 
interests of oil companies because it yields better profits. Hotelling showed oil companies 
should supply their oil in an efficient way over time in order to rise their own profit; 
otherwise if the supply oil too fast, they will not maximize their profit15. 
Although most of the literature16 related to exhaustible resources, mainly oil reserves, their 
valuation, price and extraction, is based on Hotelling models, Hotelling’s results and 
assumptions are target of some criticism. 
First of all, during the 90s the price of minerals decreased, which contradicted what Hotelling 
proposed. This was explained by two authors in different ways: Pindyck17 stated that a reason 
for prices to decrease was the declining of costs across years; Adelman18 argued that as a 
result of not having a fixed stock of resources to allocate, prices would not increase. 
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 See Hotelling, H., The economics of exhaustible resources, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 
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Lin and Wagner19 also agree that the Hotelling rule does not represent the reality of mineral 
prices. Their paper revises the Hotelling model and explains the mineral price evolution 
through stock effects and technological development. These two elements are the opposite of 
Hotelling’s assumptions – constant marginal extraction costs, independently of extraction rate 
and remaining stock, and no technological progress. 
“Stock effects increase extraction costs and are consistent with rising resource prices, 
while technological progress lowers extraction costs and causes prices to decline.”16 
 
On the one hand, the more resources are extracted achieving further depths, the fewer reserves 
remain, which leads to an increase in extraction costs and consequently rises mineral prices. 
On the other hand, technological progress and innovation improve the extraction capacity, 
allowing for an extraction cost reduction. 
The fixed and known reserves size and the optimal resource allocation supported by Hotelling 
is not consensual as well. Farzin20 outlines the shortcomings of Hotelling’s Principle’s 
assumptions, when applied to the current oil industry:  
“First, they assume that the size of reserves are fixed and known, thus discarding the effect of 
resource price on economically recoverable reserves. Second, they are primarily concerned 
with the determination of the resource extraction path based on intertemporal arbitrage of 
profits from production activity, thus abstracting from economic decisions regarding 
reserves development and discovery, which are crucial to the growth of reserves.”17 
 
Farzin and some other works21 defend that the size of reserves is not static and some factors 
like exploration activity, price and technology influence the size of reserves. Farzin developed 
an economic model of the additions to proven reserves’ process introducing an economic 
concept of reserves (an innovative factor since reserves additions are viewed primarily as a 
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geological outcome). The reserves growth can be explained both by the discovery of new 
fields as a result of drilling exploratory wells and by the additions to reserves in known fields 
through extensions. The model focuses on this last point and integrates the effects of expected 
resource price, cumulative reserves development and technological advancement. Through the 
reserves estimations analysis, the study concluded that the increases in oil price are crucial to 
the growth of proven reserves resulting from development of existing fields. 
Associated to the peak of oil theory, Watkins22 deals with the concern of the oil scarcity over 
the last three decades. Watkins states that:  
“oil is more plentiful now in an economic sense than in 1973. The reason for such 
misconceptions lies mainly in reliance on analytical techniques that do not comprehend oil 
as an economic commodity.”19 
 
Indeed, proved oil reserves increased by 80% approximately and production grew by 30% in 
thirty years, as Watkins exposed in his study. Moreover, there are new players, there is a 
rigorous development of existing plays, innovative technology and lesser reliance on OPEC 
information. Thus, there are no plausible explanations that justify resource shortage. 
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 Watkins, G.C., Oil scarcity: What have the past three decades revealed?, Energy Policy, Vol. 34 (5), pp. 508–
514, 2006. Available at http://shadow.eas.gatech.edu/~kcobb/energy/Readings/Watkins.pdf  
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CHAPTER 3: 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS EVOLUTION 
 
3.1 Information Problem 
It was until 1938 that oil was discovered in the Middle-East, and since then this region has 
turned into the world’s largest producer of oil by far. In 1960, five oil producing developing 
countries (Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) founded The Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which is currently the key player and has a massive 
market power in the oil industry. This is explained by the fact that OPEC exports 
approximately 55% of the total oil traded worldwide. Because of its coordinated production 
and supply practices, OPEC is considered a cartel, and has, therefore, a strong influence in the 
oil price23 (Houthakker, 1976). Nowadays, OPEC has 12 members ranging from the Middle 
East (the four Middle Eastern founders, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), South America 
(Venezuela and Equador), and Africa (Algeria and Libya in North Africa, Angola and Nigeria 
in Sub-Saharan African). 
While analyzing the oil market, it is clear that the information problem persists, mainly in 
what the Middle East reserves are concerned. Most of the largest reserves located there are 
held by non-publicly listed companies, therefore the information on these reserves is scarce, 
as the majority of it is confidential and the published data are poorly and unreliably reported 
(see Jean Laherre’s “Estimates of Oil Reserves”, 2001, for a discussion of the quality of oil 
reserves information). Thus, conclusions about oil reserves status, extraction rates and 
available quantities have to be drawn from unaudited statements and comments published in 
the specialized press. Consequently, oil companies operating from the Middle East can 
manage that information according to their interests. The uncertainty about Middle-East 
reserves is not a single case. Little is known, as well, about the Russian and Chinese oil 
reserves24 (Bentley, 2002). Moreover, there is no independent verification of production 
capacity installed nor is there an independent valuation of reserves in these places. However, 
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 Houthakker, H. S. (1976). The world price of oil – a medium-term analysis. American Enterprise Institute for 
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 Bentley, R.W. (2002). Global oil & gas depletion: an overview. Energy Policy, 30, 189–205 
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a good analysis of the oil market should take into account only verifiable technical data25 
(Laherrere, 2001).  
Another information problem that generates ambiguous data is when the same field is shared 
by two countries (Laherrere, 2001). Depending on the field location, the mineral rights belong 
to the correspondent state. Therefore, in order to explore and extract the hydrocarbons of the 
field, companies have to make an agreement with the government of the country in which the 
field is located, so that they can obtain the concession or the right of exploration, giving in 
return rents, taxes and royalties to the government. However, in the example of Statjford field, 
located across the Norwegian and the UK North Sea Boundary, the problem lies in the 
difference in the estimated growth of the oil annual production made by two national 
agencies. This implies that there are two distinct values for the same field/oil reserves. 
In addition to that, in some countries, data on reported reserves is not updated on a yearly 
basis, which leads to inadequate and inconsistent information26 (Bentley, 2002 and Laherrere, 
2001). 
Although in some countries there are legal requirements for publishing data on oil and gas 
reserves, the truth is that in others there are no such rules and, consequently, they have no 
obligation to making them available. As expected, oil and gas companies rather keep their 
knowledge and information confidential, otherwise competitors could take advantage of that. 
Nonetheless, if oil and gas companies were to disclose the data legally required, they would 
be certainly contributing to provide an image of transparency that is often lacking in this 
industry (Laherrere, 2001). 
 
3.2 The Problem of Oil and Gas Reserves Reporting 
Although, confidentiality and lack of information about oil and gas reserves data are two 
established features of the oil and gas industry, there are many other problems associated with 
information provided in companies’ annual reports. In other words, the problems are not only 
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related to the quantity of information, but also with the quality of the information disclosed by 
oil and gas companies in what the reserves reporting is concerned. Very often the information 
disclosed is not understandable and seems to be purposely confusing. 
The fact that the SEC privileges a conservative approach – for instance, resorting to 
definitions of reserves that are not consistent with the ones used commercially - does not 
allow disclosures to accurately reflect reality and gives some room to companies for 
managing their information, that may be misleading to shareholders and outside investors.  
There are five types of problems in what oil and gas reserves reporting are concerned. 
1. According to the SEC rules, oil and gas companies listed in the U.S. only have to disclose 
proved reserves, thus, probable and possible reserves are omitted. This conservative approach 
contrasts with the current practices of the rest of the world, as probable reserves are usually 
reported. Probable reserves are characterized for having a certainty of being produced of 50% 
or more (when probabilistic method is used), which means that, in the next years, they are 
more likely than not to be recoverable and re-categorized into proved reserves. According to 
Jean Laherre’s “Estimates of Oil Reserves”, 90% of reserves additions are due to revisions of 
past estimates, in which probable reserves had not been taken into account. Indeed, the 
disadvantage to analysts is that the growth of reserves is more influenced by the 
reclassification of probable reserves into proved reserves, then by new findings. This allows 
companies complete discretion in the timing of announcements of “new” proved reserves 
discoveries. 
Nevertheless, as the reported reserves represent a conservative view, since the SEC assumes 
that proved reserves estimation is made with “reasonable certainty”, any modification after 
having done this estimation is much more likely to be positive than negative. Hence, the SEC 
rules promote upward revisions and avoid downward ones.  
This explains why Shell’s 2004 downwards revision caused such a big uproar in the markets. 
Shell announced that it would revise their proved reserves, reducing them not by a little 
fraction, but decreasing them by about 20% – around four billion barrels. As a result, Shell 
was accused of having previously overstated their reserves intentionally, including turning 
non-proved reserves into proved reserves. The majority of the adjustments on their oil and gas 
reserves done in 2004 came from the Nigeria and Australia fields and were explained by a 
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reduction of proved undeveloped reserves (90%) and proved developed reserves (10%), since 
those reserves did not meet the accounting standards for being recognized as proved reserves.  
However, Shell’s managers actually knew about shortfall of reserves for years but they were 
kept secret, misleading the market. Consequently, this write-down revision had a huge impact 
on Shell’s value and also on investors’ confidence. This case supports the idea that reported 
reserves do not provide a realistic image. Moreover, the significant drop in Shell’s market 
value is also an indicator that the market still pays attention to these disclosures or, at least, 
distrusts lying about reserves. 
2. In what the reported quantities for reserves are concerned, a deeper understanding of 
reserves changes is necessary, since numerous problems arise with determining why these 
reserves increase or decrease.  
The different explanations for increasing or decreasing the reserves have already been 
mentioned above. Namely, we already pointed out that a substantial number of the increases 
in reported reserves cannot be explained by technological development on the extraction of 
the existing reserves, or even by the geological finding of additional new ones. Rather they 
are a result of the conservative reporting and the fact that this allows for constant 
reclassification of probable or possible reserves into proved reserves, a simple accounting 
rebranding. This leaves the real addition of physical oil and gas to the companies’ reserves 
(for technological or geological developments and discoveries) to the increase in probable or 
possible reserves. Yet, these are hardly reported and even less subject to auditing or 
independent analysis by outsiders to the oil and gas companies. Hence, the addition of 
reserves is left to the judgment of managers, who can time the announcements of new proved 
reserves according to their own incentives. 
3. Another problem of the quantities reported as reserves is the measurement units used 
(Laherrere, 2001). According to the SEC, oil reserves and natural gas liquids reserves shall be 
stated in barrels (bbl) and gas reserves shall be stated in cubic feet. However, the unit of 
measurement is not unique across the world. For instance, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
Limited (ONGC) is an Indian petroleum company, which reports its oil reserves in mmt 
(million metric tonnes) and its gas reserves in bcm (billion cubic meters). Therefore, when 
investors want to analyze the reserves quantities of two companies from different countries 
and must use distinct measures, they face an enormous obstacle, since conversions are not 
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simple at all. Given that units in which reserves are published vary across countries, 
information is not homogeneous and it is not easy to compare.  
This seems an easy problem to solve since, 1bbl = 158.987 liters and 1cubic ft = 0.028 cubic 
meters. The conversion from a volume measurement unit (such as barrels and liters) into a 
weight measurement unit (such as tones) depends on the density of the oil, and this 
information is not disclosed by the company. The problem is also that crude oil is not 
homogenously dense all over the world, with density depending on the quality of the oil and 
its origin27. This was also a problem for Gazprom AOA. In the conversion of the gas reported 
reserves by ONGC, Ltd in 2007, there is no plausible explanation to amount 11,876,534 bcf, 
which alone would constitute the world’s largest gas reserve and almost twice the total 
estimated28 world gas reserves.  
3. The valuation of oil and gas reserves is made with variables that have some intrinsic 
problems. The valuation of oil and gas reserves is presented in the “Standardized Measure of 
Discounted Future Net Cash Flows and Changes Therein Relating to Proved Oil” table. In 
order to get Cash Inflows, the reserves quantities are multiplied by year-end barrel price. As it 
was already mentioned, when SFAS 69 was created, it was a time of stable prices, so it made 
sense to value reserves at barrel price of year-end as it represents the value of reserves across 
year. However, in recent years, it has been noticed that an era of instability and uncertainty 
about barrel prices has began. Since there is high fluctuations of oil barrel price, it is not 
correct to take a year-end price as representative for the entire year. Hence, year-end barrel 
price does not reflect the value of reserves across the year and it results in overvaluation or 
undervaluation.  
We attempted to match the value of the reported reserves multiplied with the barrel price on 
December 31st with the value of the “future cash inflow” reported by the firms. However, 
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such a value is impossible to determine from the available information, as there must be other 
factors, besides the price, that influence this step, which are not referred or explained and we 
were not able to accurately identify, as we did not obtain a matching result. A substantial 
amount of crucial information needed to calculate the “future cash inflows” is not disclosed in 
the reports. For instance, the estimated timing of cash-inflows is not discriminated, nor do the 
firms disclose the extraction rate throughout the several years, or the time horizon over which 
they believe the reserves can be exploited.  
4. Capitalized costs are very poorly reported, giving a weak view of specific costs that 
companies have to “incur” with the goal of developing, expanding, drilling and exploring 
fields. 
5. Last but not least, the oil and gas industry uses many different concepts/definitions which 
are not homogeneous across worldwide. The SEC uses a specific terminology which is not 
equal to the one commonly used commercially. There is no consensus about definitions used 
and they are not clear or easy to understand, nor do they establish simple limits to what 
companies can or not enclose on each concept. Therefore, this adds noise/problems to oil and 
gas reserves reporting, because, depending on the definitions used, the values are completely 
different. 
In conclusion, “the incorrect reserve reporting” results in valuation problems and weaker 
investor confidence. The different types of reporting problems that persist in the industry 
allow oil and gas companies to overvalue or undervalue reserves that they actually own. 
Moreover, the fact that under US standards – SFAS 69, reserves quantities are unaudited and 
it is not required that reserves are prepared by an independent engineer (unlike what occurs in 
Canada) gives room for more omissions or additions to quantities and decreasing, therefore, 
the truth, confidence and reliability of numbers reported. 
 
3.3 New Financial Accounting Standards – Modernization of concepts 
On December 29th, 2008, SEC announced the revisions made to oil and gas reserves reports. It 
had been more than 25 years since the rule was last reviewed. Hence, the SEC updated the 
disclosure requirements for oil and gas companies in order to integrate the changes that 
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occurred in the last decades, not only in the characteristics of the industry but also in the terms 
used by the majority of its players.  
With the purpose of understanding better what changes SEC should make, firstly, a concept 
release for public comment was issued, and then a proposing release in order to get more 
feedback. With those comments the “rule amendments” were formulated, and became 
effective since the 1st of January 2010. 
Although the modernization of oil and gas reserves requirements and definitions has no effect 
on balance sheets of companies, it is decisive, since it improves the quality and transparency 
of information and helps investors in their investment decision making by providing more 
clarified disclosures. The revisions were focused in diversified subjects. 
The new rule allows disclosures of probable and possible reserves (allows but not mandates), 
while in the previous rule, only proved reserves are allowed. This modification is in alignment 
with the London Stock Exchange and the Australian Stock Exchange practices, as they 
require the disclosure of proved and probable reserves. SEC proposed defining probable 
reserves as “those additional reserves that are less certain to be recovered than proved reserves but which, in 
sum with proved reserves, are as likely as not to be recovered”29 and possible reserves as “those additional 
reserves that are less certain to be recovered than probable reserves”30. While probable reserves (added 
to proved reserves) have a 50% chance of economic recovery, possible reserves (added to 
proved and probable reserves) only have 10%.  
As it was already mentioned in previous chapter, the old rule only approved the classification 
of developed or undeveloped reserves to proved reserves because they were the only ones 
with allowed disclosure. With this revision, the classification of developed or undeveloped 
reserves is not only applied to proved reserves but also to possible and probable reserves, 
accordingly to development status of the reserves. 
Proved reserves definitions are modified. The concept of “reasonable certainty” used in oil 
and gas  proved reserves definition is, for the first time, defined by SEC as a “high degree of 
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confidence that quantities will be recovered” along with “high degree of confidence” means 
“much more likely to be achieved than not”. Moreover, the concept of “reliable technology” 
becomes wider, including more new different technologies that companies can use to estimate 
reserves. “Reliable technology” is defined by the new rule as a group of technologies that “has 
been field tested and has been demonstrated to provide reasonably certain results with consistency and 
repeatability in the formation being evaluated or in an analogous formation”31. Finally, the new rule 
changes the requirements of disclosure reserves by geographic area. Oil and gas companies 
have to report their reserves by groups of countries or as an individual country. More detailed, 
if companies have 15 percent or more of their total reserves placed in an individual country, 
they must disclose each country separately unless a single field is revealed or the disclosure of 
particular fields are prohibited by the law of that country. 
SEC proposed an expansion of proved undeveloped reserves definition. According to the new 
rule, oil and gas companies can also apply the new term of “reasonable certainty” in order to 
calculate the quantity of proved undeveloped reserves and can report their proved 
undeveloped reserves despite their place. Additionally, under the old rule there is a deadline 
of five years in which companies can keep their proved undeveloped reserves that continue 
undeveloped. In contrast, the new rule eliminates that limit, allowing companies to report 
proved undeveloped reserves that persist undeveloped as a result of “specific circumstances”, 
but requires the disclosure of justification for those reserves keep being classified as 
undeveloped (for instance when it is needed to construct a pipeline or processing facility 
firstly). 
The new rule establishes the valuation of oil and gas reserves using an average price based 
upon the prior 12-month period rather than a single day year-end prices to “determine the 
economic producibility of reserves”. More detailed, it consists in a non-weighted arithmetic 
average of the first day of each 12 month prior to the end of the company’s fiscal year 
(characteristically 1st January through 1st December). Nevertheless, companies should use the 
contractual price, if this is established by contractual arrangements, without considering any 
price escalations based upon future conditions. This change it is intended to improve the 
comparability among companies in what the reserves owned by them are concerned and, at 
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the same time, minimize the volatility and seasonality that is caused by the use of a single day 
price. The replacement of how oil and gas reserves are valued will have a huge repercussion 
on companies. For example, considering the prices of barrel in 2007, the year-end spot price 
is $93.68/barrel while using average will result in lower price ($71.85/barrel) given that it was 
a year of increasing prices. In contrast, taking into account barrel’s prices of 2008 the result 
using average is much higher than use year-end price because on 1st January the price was 
$97.01/barrel ending the year at $35.82/barrel, reaching on July the highest value since ever 
of $143.95/barrel.  
SEC proposed an expansion of the definition of “oil and gas producing activities”, turning 
possible the reporting of non-traditional resources, which previously were considered mining 
reserves, as oil and gas reserves. In accordance with the old rule, in “oil and gas producing 
activities” activities associated to the extraction of bitumen and other non-traditional 
resources are excluded (e.g. oil sands, shales and other nonrenewable natural resources). 
Consequently, only sources of oil and gas that engage extraction by traditional oil and gas 
wells were included. However, thanks to technology development and extraction techniques 
evolution, the category of unconventional resources had a massive expansion. The new rule 
differs from the old one because it focuses on the final product. For that reason, oil and gas 
companies are able to include in “oil and gas producing activities” the extraction of “saleable 
hydrocarbons, in the solid, liquid, or gaseous state, from oil sands, shale, coalbeds, or other nonrenewable 
natural resources which are intended to be upgraded into synthetic oil or gas, and activities undertaken with a 
view to such extraction”32.  
The modernized rule sets up a new requirement in order to ensure a clear and independent 
estimation of oil and gas reserves. Companies are required to disclose and describe the 
internal controls and the qualifications of the technical person who is responsible for the 
reserves estimation process, independently of being an employee or a third party. If the 
reserves estimations are made or audited by a third party, companies have to incorporate in 
their information disclosure a report made by this third party, in which all the assumptions, 
methodologies, analysis, results and conclusions are stated and discussed. 
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SEC gives the option, but does not require the disclosure of reserves price sensitivity. 
Companies are allowed to disclose the sensitivity of oil and gas reserves estimates 
accordingly to price variation, assuming various possible scenarios or test cases. Indeed, the 
goal is making more useful information available to investors, mainly in periods of high 
variation prices. However, the assumptions, prices and costs that support those alternative 
scenarios created by companies can be so unpredictable and unreliable that investors cannot 
take advantage of that information or even create an untruthful image of the company. 
A new position to methods used for reserves estimation is adopted by SEC. While in the old 
rule SEC prefers the determinist method but also permits the probabilistic method (not 
defined), in the new rule SEC recognizes the use of probabilistic method, defining the 
percentages similar to PRMS definitions. Thus, SEC established that “if deterministic methods are 
used, reasonable certainty means a high degree of confidence that the quantities will be recovered”, and “if 
probabilistic methods are used, there should be at least a 90% probability that the quantities actually recovered 
will equal or exceed the estimate”33. 
The modernization of oil and gas companies reports requirements and definitions were 
aligned with current ones of Petroleum Resource Management System (PRMS), whose 
practices and standards are widely accepted and developed by prestigious organizations which 
some were pointed out before like WPC and SPEE. 
With the purpose of understanding better which changes are more important to oil and gas 
companies, we analyzed all comments to concept and proposing release submitted to the SEC. 
Thus, we can conclude that the changes that are more frequently stated in the comments are 
the ones that have more relevance to companies. Since the questions of concept release are 
different from the ones made in proposing release, we built two rankings of comments that are 
shown in table 3.1 and table 3.2. On comments to concept release (SEC, 2007), companies 
pay more attention to pricing, disclosure only proved reserves versus option disclosure 
probable and possible reserves, adopt SPE-PRMS, reserves review by an independent third 
party, remove restrictions to unconventional oil and gas reserves, revision of definitions as 
“reasonable certainty” and specify tests under taken to estimate reserves (by order of 
significance). Pricing, remove restrictions to unconventional oil and gas reserves and 
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disclosure only proved reserves versus option probable and possible reserves, revisions of 
proved reserves definitions (use new technology), alignment PUD and PD recognition 
thresholds at “reasonable certainty”, adopt SPE-PRMS, reserves audits and third party 
reserves review, disclosure qualifications of personal responsible for reserves estimates and 
optional reserves sensitivity analysis are the ranking of comments in proposing release (SEC, 
2008). Summing up, the two most important changes that concern oil and gas companies are 
pricing - 12 month average, and optional disclosure probable and possible reserves. 
 
Table 3.1. Ranking of Comments on Concept Release 
Ranking of Comments on Concept Release % stated 
1º Price 12 month average 66.3 
2º Disclosure Only Proved Reserves 61.3 
3º Adopt SPE-PRMS 57.5 
4º Independent Third Party 56.3 
5º Remove restrictions to unconventional oil and gas reserves 55.0 
6º Revise the term "reasonable certainty" and "economic producibility" 45.0 
7º Specify tests undertaken to estimate reserves 23.8 
 
Table 3.2. Ranking of Comments on Proposing Release 
Ranking of Comments on Proposing Release % stated 
1º Price 12 month average 78.5 
2º Disclosure Only Proved Reserves Remove restrictions to unconventional oil and gas reserves 53.8 
3º Revisions of Proved Reserves def. - use new technology 52.3 
4º Revise the term "reasonable certainty" 47.7 
5º Adopt SPE-PRMS 43.1 
6º Reserves Audit & Third party reserves reviews 38.5 
7º Disclosure Qualifications of P. Resp. for R. Estimates 35.4 
8º Optional reserves sensitivity analysis 26.2 
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The analysis of the comments not only identifies what the main changes are, but also gives 
the perception of direction that companies wanted the new rule to have. In other words, some 
changes can be viewed as more liberal, because they allow for the report of more reserves 
(giving the option to disclosure probable and possible reserves, removing restrictions to 
unconventional resources, using new technology) and others tougher, because they require 
supervision and the control of the techniques used to determine reserves (third party reserves 
review, disclosure of qualification of who takes part in reserves estimation process and 
specification of tests applied in reserves estimation). Additionally, the optional disclosure of 
sensitivity analysis can be considered far too liberal, as companies can take advantage of high 
variation of prices used, to say that they own much more reserves than they actually own or 
the opposite situation. 
Firstly, let us look at the companies which actually comment on concept release.  
 
 37% of these companies agree that the price used should be the 12 month average 
rather than year end price.  
 In what concerns the disclosure of reserves, 61% prefer optional disclosure of 
probable and possible reserves, instead of disclosure only proved reserves, turning the 
rule more liberal as possible in order to disclosure more reserves.   
 The adoption of SPE-PRMS definitions and guidelines is considered the best option 
by 61%, as it provides a worldwide union, comparability, clarity and easier 
understanding of oil and gas industry’ standards.  
 Concerning the reserves revisions made by an independent third party, 44% say that 
they should not be mandatory, otherwise they will support the decision of making the 
rule tougher.  
 66% of the companies support that the restrictions to unconventional oil and gas 
reserves should be removed.  
 The majority of companies agree that the terms “certainty” should be revised.  
 Only one company of 19 which commented this issue agrees that specified tests 
should be undertaken to estimate reserves. 
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Secondly, the opinions on the proposing release are analyzed.  
 
 The modification of pricing to 12 month average keeps being supported by the greater 
part of companies (84%), as well as the elimination of restrictions to non-conventional 
resources (97%). 
 Almost 72% of companies do not agree on disclosing only proved reserves, they want 
the possibility to disclosure probable and possible reserve, thus the new rule will allow 
more reported reserves. 
 Regarding the new term “reliable technology”, 62% supports the use of new 
technology (more liberal than the old one) in order to determine reserves.  
 The definition of “reasonable certainty” is also revised and 45% of companies agree 
with the alignment of PUD and PD recognition threshold at “reasonable certainty”.  
 All companies support the use of SPE-PRMS definitions and standards.  
 In what concerns the audit revision, 48% disagree with that requirement; they do not 
want tougher rules.  
 44% agree that the disclosure qualifications of the personal responsible for reserves 
estimates should not be required; here, once again they would not like tougher rules.  
 Finally, on optional reserves sensitivity analysis 53% agrees with this disclosure, 
evidencing how liberal companies are.  
 
Therefore, there is no proposed modification, which companies would prefer to be tougher. 
Looking in general to all the conclusions, oil and gas companies prefer that a more liberal 
rule. Additionally, we can deduce that companies want to know more about reserves of other 
companies and also want to say more about their own reserves.  
At this instance, it is important to compare the analysis of the comments made by every 
company and the ones made by “top companies”. 
On comments to concept and proposing release, there is a consensus on opinions gave by all 
and top companies, which means they share the same concerns and attitude. The unique 
distinction is that in the option disclosure of sensitivity analysis (proposing release), top 
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companies have a clear opinion that it should not be required and in disclosure only proved 
reserves (concept release), top companies are divided (4 agree and 4 disagree). 
It is also pertinent to compare the differences among top companies’ opinions, mainly if they 
change the opinion from concept to proposing release or not. This is evidence of how the 
commenting firms take ambiguous positions in terms of siding with more liberal or 
conservative opinions. As a matter of fact, no pattern of either conservatism or liberalism can 
be drawn from the several commenting firms, as the same firms show up on both sides of the 
spectrum. What follows are a detailed set of examples of this ambiguity. 
The majority part of companies, which gave the opinion in concept and proposing release, 
agree with the disclosure of non-proved reserves, because it enhances the information 
provided, gives a better outlook of the asset evaluation and meets investor’s demand. 
However, there are other companies, such as Repsol, Imperial Oil, ENI and BP, which state 
that it only reported proved reserves should be due to the high risk and uncertainty that 
probable and possible reserves are linked to, having a more conservative approach in this 
aspect. Shell changed the opinion from concept to proposing release and one possible 
explication is the fact that it was written by a different person, meaning that even inside the 
company there is no consensus. 
Statoil Hydro, EnCana and Petrobras are in favor of requiring a preparation of reserves 
estimates by an independent third party or reserves audits. This fact represents one way of 
independent evaluation and gives more reliability to the information disclosure. Nevertheless, 
the companies which are against to this modification emphasize that the reserves estimation 
process is very complex and it is managed in a long term base, therefore the best qualified to 
evaluate reserves are the commercial and technical employees. 
The revision of pricing is supported by all top oil and gas companies, accordingly with the 
comments made, with the exception of Statoil Hydro which prefers the use of future prices 
because “ideally they represent risk discounted price forecasts”34. Total stated that the use of 12 month 
average pricing will “help smooth price variations from year-to-year while still allowing for consistency”27. 
BP affirmed that the new pricing will “represent better the exiting economic conditions”35. Imperial 
Oil justified the elimination of year-end pricing for the reason that it “does not provide meaningful 
                                                           
34
 SEC (2008), “Proposing Release”. Available at: www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-08/s71508.shtml  
35
 SEC (2007), “Concept Release”. Available at: www.sec.gov/comments/s7-29-07/s72907.shtml 
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information to investors and does not necessarily provide a good basis to evaluate a company’s enterprise 
value”28. Moreover, Shell has the opinion that single year-end price is an artificial and 
unrealistic determination of reserves value. 
On proposing release, EnCana, Shell, Total, Petrobras and Repsol sustain the use of new 
technology since “it makes technical and business sense” and “it will make the internal reserves analyzes 
more consistent” 27. It should be noticed that ENI views the disclosure of technologies as a non-
viable requirement, since the process of reserves identification involves the use of multiple 
technologies. Oil and gas companies can take advantage of this revision for the reason that 
new technology makes it “economically” possible to produce more proved reserves given that 
it is cheaper than the old one, having better margins. However, it makes less sense when oil 
and gas companies argued that it was “non-economically” viable produce proved reserves 
when price of oil was low. 
EnCana is the single company out of the four that agrees with the disclosure of reserves 
preparers qualifications. EnCana thinks that it is a high responsibility process as reserves 
estimates have consequences on oil and gas companies’ valuations. The companies that do not 
share the same opinion, such as Shell, Eni and Total, believe that this requirement is 
unfeasible given that in large companies, as it is the case, there are several specialists who 
prepare the reserves estimates across the world. 
The only change that top companies, such as Shell, Petrobras, Exxon and Repsol, have a 
tough position on is in their strong opposition to the disclosure optional of sensitivity analysis. 
Their justifications are: since the reserves are produced across different years, a sensitivity 
analysis based on year-end or 12 month average price does not make sense; it does not give 
material information to the investors as each company determines a distinct multiple price 
scenarios; it is not cost benefit justified; and promotes lack of comparability among oil and 
gas companies. Only Statoil Hydro and Total are viewed as liberals and support this optional 
disclosure. 
In summary, SEC is relaxing the current rules, which is in conformity with the will 
demonstrated by oil and gas companies as the analysis of their comments verifies and there is 
no unanimity in the side taken by the commenting firms. As a matter of fact, there is a lot of 
ambiguity in these comments 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CASE STUDY: “25 TOP OIL AND GAS COMPANIES” 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
In order to analyze the reported reserves worldwide, 25 oil and gas companies constitute the 
sample chosen to be examined in the case study. These 25 top oil and gas companies across 
the world were collected from a ranking named “Platts Top 250 Global Energy Companies” 
for 2007, in which companies are positioned accordingly with their financial performance, 
defined by a special Platts formula that includes assets value, revenues, profits and return on 
invested capital (ROIC). We exclude the electricity companies which are also in this energy 
companies ranking, and other oil and gas company that do not have available information. 
The 25 top oil and gas companies remaining in our sample are in the table 4.1, listed 
according to the position in the original ranking. 
The total net proved developed and undeveloped reserves across nine years (2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011) were gathered from the 25 top oil and gas 
companies’ annual reports. In more detail, the oil and gas reserves quantities are generally 
reported in “Reserve Quantity Information”, a table which is included in “Supplemental 
Information on Oil and Gas Producing Activities Unaudited”. The unit of oil reserves is 
millions of barrels (MMbbl) and the unit of natural gas reserves is billion cubic feet (bcf). The 
major part of companies discriminate their oil and gas reserves by areas (country or group of 
countries), although it is not a common practice. 
Therefore, the oil and gas reserves of the 25 top companies were summed by year and by area, 
since the goal is to determine if the oil and gas companies are underestimating or 
overestimating their reported reserves. Thus, it is possible to compare with the world total 
reserves per year and according with reserves’ place. In addition, the evolution of oil and gas 
reserves is analyzed. 
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Table 4.1. Platts Ranking of Top Energy Companies (Platts, 2007) 
Rank Company Country (state) 
1 ExxonMobil Corp. USA (Texas) 
2 BP plc UK 
3 Royal Dutch Shell plc UK 
4 Chevron Corp. USA (California) 
5 Total France 
6 Petrochina Co. Ltd. China 
7 StatoilHydro ASA Norway 
8 ENI SpA Italy 
9 Petrobras Brasileiro Brazil 
10 ConocoPhillips USA (Texas) 
11 LUKOIL Oil Co. Russia 
12 Marathon Oil Corp. USA (Texas) 
13 China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. China 
14 Rosneft Oil Company Russia 
15 Gazprom OAO Russia 
16 Occidental Petroleum Corp. USA (California) 
17 EnCana Corp. Canada 
18 Norsk Hydro AS Norway 
19 Repsol YPF SA Spain 
20 Gaz de France France 
21 BG Group plc UK 
22 Imperial Oil Ltd. Canada 
23 Hess Corp. USA (New York) 
24 CNOOC Ltd. Japan (Hong Kong) 
25 OMV AG Austria 
 
4.2 Data Analysis 
After the data collection, the next step is to analyze the oil and gas reserves from the 25 top 
companies across nine years. Since the goal is to compare the total reported reserves by these 
25 companies with the world total estimated reserves, the analysis will focus on total reserves 
per year, overlooking the reason of their variations. 
Firstly, the year-end reserves of the 25 top companies have to be summed. When doing this, 
some problems come up. Concerning the oil reserves, which should be measured in MMbbl 
(millions of barrels), there are three types of problems: the information of Rosneft and 
Gazprom’s reserves for 2003 and 2004, and Gaz de France’s reserves from 2008 to 2011 is 
not available; in 2003 and 2004 Gazprom only reported the sum of their proved and probable 
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reserves or accordingly to the Russian reserves system, so we cannot take into account 
because it is not available only the volume of proved reserves; and NorskHydro report their 
oil reserves in millions of boe (barrel of oil equivalent), which makes it impossible to convert 
the values into millions of barrels, given the lack of information on the density of the oil. 
Thus, NorskHydro had to be excluded. Gazprom report its oil reserves in million tons but give 
in its annual report a conversion table to million barrels (1 ton oil = 7.33 barrels). In terms of 
the natural gas reserves, whose values should be in bcf (billions of cubic feet)36, there are also 
some problems. Once again, Rosneft and Gazprom’s reserves for 2003 and 2004, and Gaz de 
France’s reserves from 2008 to 2011 are not available. Additionally, Rosneft, Gazprom and 
Gaz de France do not report their natural gas reserves in bcf. Gaz de France’s natural gas 
reserves must therefore be excluded, since they are measured in mbep (millions of barrels 
equivalent petroleum). In case of natural gas reserves of Rosneft and Gazprom, since they are 
expressed in bcm, they can be converted into bcf (1bcf = 0.0283 bcm). It is important to 
notice that there are no NorskHydro reserves since 2007, because on October 2007, 
NorskHydro merged with Statoil, creating StatoilHydro. Once the adjustments are made, it is 
possible to add up. Table 4.2 and table 4.3 depict the results. 
Having done this, these values must be compared with the world total oil and gas reserves 
estimates, which were obtained from a study made by BP named “BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy June 2012”. Additionally, it is relevant to mention that natural gas reserves on 
the study were converted into bcf, since they were initially expressed in bcm. 
The results obtained, which are represented in table 4.4, can represent different 
realities/conclusions. Looking at the 25 top oil reserves total, it only represents approximately 
7% of the world total oil reserves estimates. Natural gas reality is not very different, with the 
25 top natural gas reported reserves reaching around 15 of the world total natural gas 
estimates. It is essential to retain that, in both analyses; the total for 2003 and 2004 is smaller 
than for the other years, because Rosneft and Gazprom’s reserves for these two years are 
missing.  
 
 
                                                           
36
 Throughout the document we are using the units’ denominations and nomenclatures used in the reports. 
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Table 4.2 Top Companies’ Total Oil Reported Reserves  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
Exxon 10,113 9,418 9,215 7,576 7,744 8,194 7,813 8,395 9,889
BP 5,153 5,559 5,658 5,665 5,492 5,893 6,360 6,755 7,214
Shell 5,098 5,179 4,693 2,620 2,751 3,270 3,466 3,745 5,009
Chevron 4,295 4,270 4,610 4,735 4,665 5,294 5,626 5,511 6,280
Total 3,734 4,014 4,041 4,410 4,396 5,516 5,582 5,889 6,151
Petrochina 11,128 11,278 11,263 11,221 11,706 11,618 11,536 11,501 11,495
Statoil 2,181 2,023 2,070 2,074 2,389 2,423 2,614 1,721 1,789
Eni 3,134 3,415 3,377 3,243 3,127 3,457 3,748 3,972 4,138
Petrobras 10,783 10,731 10,269 9,106 9,547 9,418 9,716 9,945 9,772
Conocophillips 3,287 3,161 3,194 3,340 3,104 3,200 3,336 3,167 3,290
LukOil 13,123 13,025 13,383 14,242 15,492 15,593 15,774 15,516 15,573
Marathon 1,356 1,202 1,225 636 650 677 660 560 576
Chinapetroleum 2,848 2,889 2,919 2,961 3,024 3,295 3,294 3,267 3,257
Rosneft 18,351 18,110 18,058 17,694 17,513 15,963 14,877 - -
Gazprom 5,306 5,259 5,267 5,228 5,329 5,050 3,876 - -
Occidental 2,288 2,310 2,263 2,080 2,226 2,213 1,962 1,858 1,990
Encana 133 93 77 1,006 927 1,133 1,121 501 957
Norsk hydro - - - - - - - - -
Repsol 978 908 883 903 952 1,059 1,167 1,582 1,768
Gaz de france - - - - 174 167 209 187 191
BG 1,105 946 736 688 506 552 572 635 645
Imperial oil 3,121 2,453 2,415 694 725 681 760 812 889
Hess 1,169 1,104 967 970 885 832 692 646 646
CNOOC 1,960 1,719 1,668 1,578 1,564 1,490 1,457 1,456 1,436
OMV 628 660 675 696 698 738 782 827 237
TOTAL 111,272 109,726 108,926 103,365 105,586 107,727 107,000 88,449 93,191
OIL (millions of barrels)
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Table 4.3. Top Companies’ Total Natural Gas Reported Reserves 
 
 
Table 4.4 Top 25’ Total Proved Reserves versus World Total Estimated37 
 
 
                                                           
37
 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy
_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.pdf 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
Exxon 45,375 46,813 34,442 31,402 32,610 32,480 33,355 31,843 33,395
BP 36,381 37,809 40,388 40,005 41,130 42,168 44,448 45,650 45,155
Shell 30,286 28,983 29,961 25,927 22,825 30,058 24,912 25,050 38,370
Chevron 25,229 20,755 22,153 19,022 19,137 19,910 20,466 16,128 17,553
Total 20,775 19,143 19,384 19,617 19,083 19,066 20,270 21,159 20,675
Petrochina 66,653 65,503 63,244 61,189 57,111 53,469 48,123 45,249 41,787
Statoil 17,681 17,965 18,148 18,984 20,319 20,696 20,987 14,415 13,886
Eni 15,582 16,198 16,262 17,214 16,549 16,897 17,501 18,278 18,008
Petrobras 12,381 11,894 10,988 12,139 12,469 11,766 12,352 11,247 11,202
Conocophillips 17,600 18,235 18,965 20,160 22,499 23,446 16,513 16,834 15,834
LukOil 22,922 23,340 22,564 29,079 27,747 26,404 25,100 24,385 24,307
Marathon 2,666 2,617 2,724 3,219 3,450 3,510 3,547 3,472 2,784
Chinapetroleum 6,709 6,447 6,739 6,959 6,331 2,857 2,952 3,033 2,888
Rosneft 30,017 27,934 28,817 27,687 25,109 24,756 24,402 - -
Gazprom 678,512 670,697 657,227 642,320 645,806 642,313 566,896 - -
Occidental 5,323 5,138 5,027 4,452 3,843 3,724 3,374 2,851 2,585
Encana 13,441 13,775 11,062 13,678 13,300 12,418 11,784 10,460 8,411
Norsk hydro - - - - - 6,611 6,761 6,626 7,317
Repsol 6,747 6,643 6,744 7,341 8,156 8,718 12,137 14,342 15,447
Gaz de france - - - - - - - - -
BG 12,854 11,685 11,181 10,623 9,196 9,582 9,667 9,076 8,758
Imperial oil 422 576 590 593 622 673 765 880 1,023
Hess 2,423 2,598 2,821 2,773 2,668 2,466 2,406 2,400 2,332
CNOOC 5,636 5,945 5,944 5,623 6,223 6,232 5,431 4,647 4,154
OMV 2,797 2,727 2,846 2,825 2,878 3,071 3,247 3,493 1,039
TOTAL 1,078,412 1,063,419 1,038,221 1,022,832 1,019,061 1,023,291 937,396 331,517 336,910
NATURAL GAS (billions of cubic feet)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. %
Top 25 111 7 110 7 109 7 103 7 106 8 108 8 107 8 88 7 93 7
World Estimated 1,653 1,622 1,518 1,475 1,405 1,365 1,357 1,346 1,340
Top 25 1,078 15 1,063 15 1,038 16 1,023 16 1,019 16 1,023 17 937 15 332 5 337 6
World Estimated 7,361 6,926 6,616 6,535 6,235 6,117 6,084 6,067 6,049
Oil (Thousand million barrels)
Natural Gas (Trillion cubic meters)
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Since the sample is composed by 25 companies and Middle East companies are not taken into 
account, it is clear that the sample is too small to allow taking conclusions and therefore 
cannot really represent the existing reserves. However, at the same time, it can also be viewed 
as a good sample, since it includes the top companies of the world in oil and gas industry, 
who own substantially more oil and gas reserves, than the companies placed in the bottom 
positions of the ranking. For this reason, it does not make sense to believe that the 25 top 
companies only own 7% of oil reserves in the world.  
Thus, this suggests that companies sub-estimate their reserves, reporting smaller amounts of 
reserves than what they actually own. However, there is a large part of world reserves that do 
not have available data for analysis – for instance, the Middle East reserves which represent, 
in 2011, 48% of the total world oil reserves and 38% of the total world gas reserves (BP 
Statistical Review, 2012). 
When analyzing deeply the natural gas reserves which are represented in table 4.3, it can be 
confirmed that the total reserves of all years are influenced by Gazprom natural gas reserves. 
For example, Gazprom natural gas reserves are approximately 60% of the total, making this 
case worth noting. There are five possible interpretations for these values: 
 
1. Since it derives from a conversion of bcm into bcf, there may be an error in the 
conversion process or a misinterpretation of the units; 
2. Gazprom is overestimating their natural gas reserves, in other words, they are 
reporting a lot more reserves than those they own; 
3. Gazprom is telling the truth and it owns the biggest quantity of reserves; 
4. Gazprom reports their real reserves but the other companies are sub-estimating; 
5. A combination of the previous reasons. 
 
Most of Gazprom’s reserves are in Russia, reportedly the country with the largest natural gas 
reserves, even exceeding the Middle-East reserves. Any of these explanations are plausible 
explanations for these numbers. 
In order to improve the analysis, the year-end reserves of the 25 top companies were grouped 
by region at table 4.5. This will allow verifying in which regions are placed with more 
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significance the oil and gas reserves and if it is aligned with the study made by BP which are 
pictured in table 4.6. 
Some of the 25 top companies split the total of oil and gas reserves in regions/countries, 
depending on where they are placed. So, taking advantage of that information, the reserves of 
25 companies were carefully joined by region and by year. Having done this, to simplify and 
turn the analysis easier, they were summed according to the group of countries/continents, 
which are: North America, Central & South America, Africa, Eurasia, Asia & Oceana, Europe 
and Others. The percentage of reserves in different regions differs a lot from the one showed 
in “BP Statistical Review”. However, the comparison proposed has some barriers/limitations. 
On the one hand, there is a strong lack of information on Middle East reserves. Not only do 
Middle East oil and gas companies not make available their reserves data, but also the 25 top 
companies do not separate their Middle East reserves (when they own) from the others. Due 
to the fact that Middle East reserves represent around 50% of world total, as it was already 
mentioned, it is an inaccuracy not considering them in the analysis. On the other hand, since 
lots of companies do not have reported reserves by region, it becomes harder to make the 
analysis, because all those reserves are classified as “others” when summed by region. 
Therefore, the major part of reserves are in “others”. For instance, in 2011, the “others” oil 
reserves represents 51% of the total, and in 2007/2009, natural gas reserves of “others” 
achieves 78% of the total.  
As a consequence of these limitations the information is scanty and makes it impossible to 
derive any accurate conclusions.  
According to “BP Statistical Review”, from 2003 to 2011, the areas with more oil reserves are 
Middle East and America by order of magnitude. By looking at (top companies reserves by 
region) table 4.5, if the “others” category is overlooked, America and Eurasia correspond to 
the biggest percentage of oil reserves. The gas reserves of top companies are equally 
distributed (excluding “others”) by all regions which contrast with total gas reserves estimated 
by BP’ study in which Middle East and Europe & Eurasia are the regions with more gas 
reserves. 
By looking at each company, the reserves’ evolution can be analyzed. In oil reserves, most 
companies present their reserves decreasing from 2003 until 2008, as is the case of BP, 
Chevron, Total, Lukoil, Chinapetroleum, Repsol and OMV. However, in some companies 
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like Exxon, Shell, Petrobras, Imperial Oil and BG, the oil reserves diminished until 
2007/2008 but from 2009 onwards they showed a significant rise. This can be explained 
because since 2009, the reserves estimation and disclosure requirements changed according to 
the “modernization of oil and gas reporting” release. Those companies also started to report 
their synthetic oil and bitumen separately. Few companies have oil reserves positive growth 
from 2003 to 2011, for example, Rosneft, Occidental Petroleum, Hess, CNOOC and 
Marathon. Hence, oil reserves of CNOOC and Marathon increased even more in 2009, when 
the modification made on SFAS 69 became effective, as it mentioned before. In what 
concerns natural gas reserves, contrasting with oil reserves reality, the majority of companies 
are increasing their reported reserves. This is the case of Exxon, Shell, Chevron, Petrochina, 
Chinapetroleum, Rosneft, Gazprom, Occidental Petroleum, Encana and BG. A few companies 
present a declining value of their natural gas reserves, such as BP, ENI, Repsol and Imperial 
Oil. Petrochina is a good example of a positive growth in natural gas reserves, which is 
explained by extensions and discoveries made. Moreover, OMV also achieves an enormous 
increase in its oil and gas reserves in 2004 due to the purchase of reserves placed in Petrom. It 
is curious that most of companies that have a positive growth in their oil reserves also have in 
their natural gas reserves. 
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Table 4.5 Top Companies’ Proved Reserves by Region 
 
 
Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume %
North America 9,159 8 9,025 8 8,435 8 10,155 10 13,401 13 14,283 13 14,585 14 13,409 15 15,740 17
Central & South America 11,506 10 11,402 10 10,926 10 9,818 9 10,122 10 10,104 9 10,274 10 10,891 12 10,987 12
Africa 9,054 8 9,949 9 10,165 9 10,302 10 10,295 10 11,107 10 11,417 11 12,075 14 13,037 14
Eurasia 13,770 12 13,897 13 14,272 13 15,190 15 16,969 16 18,065 17 18,077 17 17,799 20 17,419 19
Asia & Oceania 5,594 5 6,446 6 6,392 6 6,775 7 4,382 4 3,731 3 4,471 4 4,563 5 4,988 5
Europe 5,769 5 5,452 5 5,417 5 5,531 5 7,105 7 7,571 7 8,441 8 8,157 9 8,478 9
Others 56,420 51 53,556 49 53,318 49 45,595 44 43,311 41 42,867 40 39,735 37 21,554 24 22,543 24
TOTAL 111,272 109,726 108,926 103,365 105,586 107,727 107,000 88,449 93,191
2004 2003
Proved Oil Reserves (millions of barrels)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume %
North America 75,958 7 73,979 7 56,817 5 60,470 6 86,913 9 86,801 8 82,952 9 78,641 24 79,360 24
Central & South America 18,867 2 18,390 2 17,566 2 19,209 2 18,318 2 18,148 2 21,238 2 22,048 7 23,198 7
Africa 23,629 2 24,341 2 24,112 2 22,785 2 25,453 2 26,025 3 26,156 3 25,817 8 22,359 7
Eurasia 20,746 2 21,307 2 20,994 2 27,443 3 32,065 3 38,471 4 31,394 3 29,497 9 26,249 8
Asia & Oceania 63,786 6 59,329 6 63,822 6 53,721 5 40,875 4 41,326 4 45,203 5 42,139 13 41,369 12
Europe 39,969 4 40,806 4 42,097 4 44,632 4 50,809 5 58,996 6 63,481 7 60,465 18 75,677 22
Others 835,458 77 825,268 78 812,814 78 794,573 78 764,627 75 753,524 74 666,972 71 72,911 22 68,698 20
TOTAL 1,078,412 1,063,419 1,038,221 1,022,832 1,019,061 1,023,291 937,396 331,517 336,910
Proved Natural Gas Reserves (billions of cubic feet)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
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Table 4.6 World Total Reserves Estimates (source: BP Statistical Review) 
 
Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume %
North America 217 13 218 13 219 14 217 15 221 16 222 16 224 17 224 17 226 17
Central & South America 325 20 325 20 238 16 199 13 124 9 111 8 103 8 103 8 100 7
Africa 132 8 133 8 130 9 128 9 127 9 119 9 118 9 114 8 112 8
Europe & Eurasia 141 9 139 9 137 9 136 9 138 10 115 8 116 9 114 9 116 9
Middle East 795 48 766 47 753 50 754 51 755 54 756 55 756 56 750 56 746 56
Asia Pacific 41 2 42 3 42 3 42 3 40 3 41 3 41 3 41 3 40 3
TOTAL 1,653 1,622 1,518 1,475 1,405 1,365 1,357 1,346 1,340
2007 2006 2005 2004 20032008200920102011
Proved Oil Reserves (billions of barrels)
Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume % Volume %
North America 382 5 365 5 346 5 319 5 309 5 283 5 276 5 264 4 261 4
Central & South America 268 4 264 4 263 4 262 4 260 4 256 4 242 4 246 4 241 4
Africa 513 7 513 7 520 8 518 8 516 8 508 8 497 8 501 8 489 8
Europe & Eurasia 2,779 38 2,401 35 2,224 34 2,201 34 2,013 32 2,015 33 2,022 33 2,026 33 2,040 34
Middle East 2,826 38 2,803 40 2,682 41 2,664 41 2,620 42 2,569 42 2,571 42 2,555 42 2,555 42
Asia Pacific 592 8 581 8 580 9 572 9 517 8 487 8 476 8 475 8 462 8
TOTAL 7,361 6,926 6,616 6,535 6,235 6,117 6,084 6,067 6,049
Proved Natural Gas Reserves (trillions of cubic feet)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
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CHAPTER 5: 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, the results are discussed and the research questions will be addressed. 
The previous analysis demonstrated that the total oil and gas reported reserves by the 25 top 
companies is smaller than the world total estimated oil and gas reserves, 7% and 15% 
respectively. Possible explanations for this outcome may be:  
• The majority the larger of companies is underestimating their oil and gas reserves, 
while the smaller companies, not considered in the analysis, are overestimating their 
reserves. 
• We are missing the larger reserves in the World, as the values for the Middle Eastern 
reserves are not disclosed ever, which clearly hinders our ability to draw any 
conclusive explanation. 
In our opinion, it does not make sense that the reserves of the biggest 25 oil and gas 
companies in the world (even excluding Middle-East companies) represent such a low 
percentage of world reserves estimations. This is enhanced by the fact that the oil and gas 
industry is characterized for having a high level of concentration, which means that few 
companies own or control large part of the reserves.  
Moreover, it suggests that oil and gas companies possibly have agreements with Middle-
Eastern companies, which do not have much available information, and are, consequently, 
supporting them in hiding important information as well.  
Another alternative to explain the results is that the total world reserves could be 
overestimated. However, since peak oil is also based on those values, the reserves estimation 
rather than being overestimated, should be considered as conservative, meaning that 
estimations are likely lower than the real values. This would lead to the reported reserves by 
top oil and gas companies constituting a superior percentage of conservative or pessimist 
values. 
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In “Global oil & gas depletion: an overview” Bentley38 noticed that when looking at proved 
and probable reserves a “general commercial tendency to be under-reported in large fields and over-
reported in small” is shown. The analogy with “price makers” and “price takers” can be applied. 
The first ones are oil companies that report less than they actually own (under-reported) 
because they have large oil reserves but want to enhance the oil as a scarce resource, 
therefore, increasing oil price. The last ones report more than they actually own (over-
reported) because they want to take advantage of a more solid image.  
Adding all these reasons to the fact that the accounting rule is not rigid enough, while 
allowing noise and giving room for companies’ strategic factors influence the reserves 
disclosure, it can be concluded that total estimation of oil and gas reserves in the world cannot 
be calculated summing up the reported reserves by top oil and gas companies.  
Although accounting rules are improving and trying to offer better definitions and disclosures 
requirements, the reporting of oil and gas reserves is still one step behind of the desired 
veracity. Even with the modernization of rules, that promoted an increase of oil reserves 
reported by top oil companies as analyzed in previous chapter, they still allow noise in oil and 
gas reporting. They have neither started requiring an audit/independent third entity to review 
reserves, nor have they defined a common price to be used in reserves’ valuation (they simply 
revise how to calculate the price). The new changes to the accounting rule are not giving 
enough incentives for the oil and natural gas companies to disclose the reserves they actually 
own. This is also justified by the fact that SEC asks for companies’ opinion and since it wants 
to collaborate with them, the change tends to become minimal. Through the analysis of 
comments about concept and propose release, it was clear in some topics that there are 
companies much tougher than others willing to disclose more information about themselves 
and wanting to get more information about their competitors. In the oil and natural gas 
industry, the information is a surplus value.  
The ultimate incentive that oil and gas companies have in reserves disclosure is their profit. 
Therefore, in most cases, two different types of strategies can be identified. The first strategy 
adopted is when barrel price is low, companies seem to put a “social curtain” in order to 
transmit that they have few reserves. Hence, they have an incentive to report less oil reserves 
arguing that it is not economic viable to extract it, which means that, since the oil price is so 
                                                           
38
 Bentley, R.W. (2002). Global oil & gas depletion: an overview. Energy Policy, 30, 189–205 
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low, it does not compensate the extraction costs because it would yield lower margins. The 
second one is when barrel price is high, for instance in 2007, and companies take off the 
“social curtain”. In this case, oil companies have the incentive to report more oil reserves and 
extract them because the high oil price will allow companies to achieve better margins. 
Generally, when oil price is increasing, it is likely that oil companies will declare that they 
have found more reserves in a new or an old field. The announcement enhances their value 
and companies usually get a better stock market position. 
Taking into consideration that oil price is a result of many factors, which include the 
investors’ expectations, and that the peak of oil theory is frequently recalled, the oil 
companies’ behavior is described like a cycle as follows. Since the press communicated there 
was a possibility of oil running out sooner than it was expected, the fear among customers 
was installed, rising the oil demand, making the oil price increase. When the oil price is high, 
oil companies have an incentive to report more oil reserves, making higher profit. By showing 
that there are large oil reserves, the fear of oil shortage disappears, and consequently, oil 
demand decreases and the oil price diminishes. Therefore, oil companies have an incentive to 
put a “social curtain” arguing that extraction is not economic viable and the cycle begins once 
again. 
One way to compare how reserves are valued from inside of company and outside is looking 
at capitalized costs and multiplication between quantity of barrels and the market price, 
respectively. There is no necessary correlation between them. Capitalized costs are all costs 
associated to acquiring properties, drilling and exploit wells, development of fields, 
equipment and facilities used in oil and gas activities. Thus, each company depending on the 
costs associated to their proved or unproved reserves will generate capitalized costs which 
will also reflect the investment made on those reserves. Otherwise, the quantity of barrels 
multiplied by the oil price will give an external point of view of the reserves’ value. This 
result should be viewed as how much are consumers willing to pay for a determined number 
of barrels or how does market value a barrel. While oil price has high variation, mainly in 
latest years, so it will have a daily result; capitalized costs can be seen as medium/long-term 
costs that initially are capitalized independently of finding or not proved reserves. Therefore, 
the best scenario for oil companies is high barrel price and low capitalized costs. They cannot 
be compared since they represent two distinct points of views. 
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The caveats of analysis to note are mainly related to the data used. Although the analysis is 
based on top oil and gas companies, it does not take into account oil and gas companies of the 
Middle East, which are the largest ones, having so much power that they end up acting as a 
cartel. The comparison between the oil and gas reported reserves by companies in their annual 
report and the total world reserves is only made across nine years. Finally, it is assumed that 
the 25 top oil and gas companies are representative of the industry, which means that they 
have the largest market shares (excluding Middle East companies). 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
In the oil industry, disclosed information has large implications on companies’ results. The 
importance and influence of the accounting rule – SFAS 69 – followed by oil and gas 
companies in reporting their reserves, was the main issue studied in this thesis. 
The comparison between the quantity of reserves reported by the top oil and gas companies 
included in the collected sample and the world total estimated  reserves,  allowed us to 
conclude that oil and gas companies are under-reporting their reserves. 
The current accounting rule is not enough of an incentive for companies to report the actual 
reserves they own. Additionally, when the rule was changed, SEC asked for oil and gas 
companies to give their opinion on a few criteria they were proposing to modify, in an effort 
to try to align the goals of those companies with the amendments made. This supports the idea 
of cooperating with companies and taking into account their goals, rather than simply defining 
strict rules with the sole purpose of reporting the real reserves with the least subjectivity 
possible.  
As expected, the heavy changes proposed will not be fully implemented, since no consensus 
was reached among oil and gas companies. For instance, no audits or reserves review made 
by a third party will be required. Instead, companies will only have to disclose and describe 
the internal controls, as well as the qualifications of the technical person. This means 
companies will still have internal control over their reserves estimations. Even though 
estimating the reserves is a complex and continuous process, it is also one which is based on 
judgments. It is, thus, obvious that the new rule still gives companies some freedom in their 
disclosing of reported reserves.  
Even though, these changes try to improve the quality of the data reported by companies, 
several adjustments still have to be made so that oil and gas companies reported reserves 
actually reflect what the companies really own. According to the new rule, reserves’ valuation 
will be calculated using the annual average of oil price, which is better than the last day of the 
year price, as it reduces volatility and protects against abnormal prices on that particular day. 
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In periods where volatility is actually relevant and should not be overseen, the new rule would 
lose this effect. Whatever price the rule would pick some information or characteristics would 
be inevitably missed. 
SEC should, therefore, throughout the accounting rule, seek for compromises and keep 
promoting best practices in oil industry, improving the quality of oil and gas reserves data. 
Having concluded this thesis, we believe that it would also be interesting to analyze the 
number of reported reserves of each top company, according to their opinion on new SFAS 69 
(concept and proposing release). This would allow to categorize companies and define a 
profile (for instance, tough or liberal), depending on the quantity of reserves reported. The 
influence of oil price on the quantity of reserves reported on a monthly basis also strikes us as 
a curious study. Moreover, the analysis of the difference between the information quality and 
quantity of reported reserves by companies before and after January, when the new FAS 69 
was issued, could be a pertinent additional study as well. 
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Table 2.1 Reserves’ definitions 
Reserves SEC 1978 SPE/WPC 1997 SEC 2008 
Proved 
 
Proved oil and gas reserves are the estimated quantities 
of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids which 
geological and engineering data demonstrate with 
reasonable certainty to be recoverable in future years 
from known reservoirs under existing economic and 
operating conditions, i.e., prices and costs as of the 
date the estimate is made. Prices include consideration 
of changes in existing prices provided only by 
contractual arrangements, but not on escalations based 
upon future conditions. 
Proved reserves are those quantities of petroleum 
which, by analysis of geological and engineering data, 
can be estimated with reasonable certainty to be 
commercially recoverable, from a given date forward, 
from known reservoirs and under current economic 
conditions, operating methods, and government 
regulations. Proved reserves can be categorized as 
developed or undeveloped. 
Proved oil and gas reserves are those quantities of oil 
and gas, which, by analysis of geosciences and 
engineering data, can be estimated with reasonable 
certainty to be economically producible—from a given 
date forward, from known reservoirs, and under 
existing economic conditions, operating methods, and 
government regulations—prior to the time at which 
contracts providing the right to operate expire, unless 
evidence indicates that renewal is reasonably certain, 
regardless of whether deterministic or probabilistic 
methods are used for the estimation The project to 
extract the hydrocarbons must have commenced or the 
operator must be reasonably certain that it  will 
commence the project within a reasonable time 
Unproved N/A Unproved reserves are based on geologic and/or 
engineering data similar to that used in estimates of 
proved reserves; but technical, contractual, economic, 
or regulatory uncertainties preclude such reserves 
being classified as proved. Unproved reserves may be 
further classified as probable reserves and possible 
reserves. 
N/A 
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Reserves SEC 1978 SPE/WPC 1997 SEC 2008 
Developed Proved developed oil and gas reserves are reserves that 
can be expected to be recovered through existing wells 
with existing equipment and operating methods. 
Additional oil and gas expected to be obtained through 
the application of fluid injection or other improved 
recovery techniques for supplementing the natural 
forces and mechanisms of primary recovery should be 
included as proved developed reserves only after 
testing by a pilot project or after the operation of an 
installed program has confirmed through production 
response that increased recovery will be achieved 
Developed reserves are expected to be recovered from 
existing wells including reserves behind pipe. 
Improved recovery reserves are considered developed 
only after the necessary equipment has been installed, 
or when the costs to do so are relatively minor. 
Developed reserves may be sub-categorized as 
producing or non-producing. 
Developed oil and gas reserves are reserves of any 
category that can be expected to be recovered: 
- Through existing wells with existing equipment and 
operating methods or in which the cost of the required 
equipment is relatively minor compared to the cost of a 
new well; and 
- Through installed extraction equipment and 
infrastructure operational at the time of the reserves 
estimate if the extraction is by means not involving a 
well 
Undeveloped Proved undeveloped oil and gas reserves are reserves 
that are expected to be recovered from new wells on 
undrilled acreage, or from existing wells where a 
relatively major expenditure is required for 
recompletion. Reserves on undrilled acreage shall be 
limited to those drilling units offsetting productive 
units that are reasonably certain of production when 
drilled. Proved reserves for other undrilled units can be 
claimed only where it can be demonstrated with 
certainty that there is continuity of production from the 
existing productive formation.  
Undeveloped reserves are expected to be recovered:  
(1) from new wells on undrilled acreage, 
(2) from deepening existing wells to a different 
reservoir, or  
(3) where a relatively large expenditure is required to 
(a) recomplete an existing well or (b) install production 
or transportation facilities for primary or improved 
recovery projects. 
Undeveloped oil and gas reserves are reserves of any 
category that are expected to be recovered from new 
wells on undrilled acreage, or from existing wells 
where a relatively major expenditure is required for 
recompletion 
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Reserves SEC 1978 SPE/WPC 1997 SEC 2008 
Undeveloped 
(cont.) 
Under no circumstances should estimates for proved 
undeveloped reserves be attributable to any acreage for 
which an application of fluid injection or other 
improved recovery technique is contemplated, unless 
such techniques have been proved effective by actual 
tests in the area and in the same reservoir. 
 
 
Producing N/A Reserves subcategorized as producing are expected to 
be recovered from completion intervals which are open 
and producing at the time of the estimate. Improved 
recovery reserves are considered producing only after 
the improved recovery project is in operation. 
N/A 
Non-
producing 
N/A Reserves subcategorized as non-producing include 
shut-in and behind-pipe reserves. Shut-in reserves are 
expected to be recovered from  
(1) completion intervals which are open at the time of 
the estimate but which have not started producing,  
(2) wells which were shutin for market conditions or 
pipeline connections, or  
(3) wells not capable of production for mechanical 
reasons. 
N/A 
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Reserves SEC 1978 SPE/WPC 1997 SEC 2008 
Probable  Probable reserves are those unproved reserves which 
analysis of geological and engineering data suggests 
are more likely than not to be recoverable. In this 
context, when probabilistic methods are used, there 
should be at least a 50% probability that the quantities 
actually recovered will equal or exceed the sum of 
estimated proved plus probable reserves. 
Probable reserves are those additional reserves that are 
less certain to be recovered than proved reserves but 
which, together with proved reserves, are as likely as 
not to be recovered. When deterministic methods are 
used, it is as likely as not that actual remaining 
quantities recovered will exceed the sum of estimated 
proved plus probable reserves. When probabilistic 
methods are used, there should be at least a 50% 
probability that the actual quantities recovered will 
equal or exceed the proved plus probable reserves 
estimates. 
Possible N/A Possible reserves are those unproved reserves which 
analysis of geological and engineering data suggests 
are less likely to be recoverable than probable reserves. 
In this context, when probabilistic methods are used, 
there should be at least a 10% probability that the 
quantities actually recovered will equal or exceed the 
sum of estimated proved plus probable plus possible 
reserves. 
Possible reserves are those  additional reserves that are 
less certain to be recovered than probable reserves. 
When deterministic methods are used, the total 
quantities ultimately recovered from a project have a 
low probability of exceeding proved plus probable plus 
possible reserves. When probabilistic methods are 
used, there should be at least a 10% probability that the 
total quantities ultimately recovered will equal or 
exceed the proved plus probable plus possible reserves 
estimates. 
(Source: Gaffney, Cline & Associates (2009). A review of the revised Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Oil and Gas Reserves Reporting 
Requirements; and SPE (2005) – “Glossary of Terms Used in Petroleum Reserves/Resources Definitions” 
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Table 4.5.1 Top Companies’ Total Oil Reported Reserves by Region 
  Oil - millions of barrels 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
  Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % 
NORTH 
AMERICA 9,159 8 9,025 8 8,435 8 10,155 10 13,401 13 14,283 13 14,585 14 13,409 15 15,740 17 
United States 5,945 5 5,996 5 5,465 5 5,465 5 7,508 7 7,514 7 7,924 7 8,178 9 8,619 9 
North America 176 0 146 0 161 0 316 0 237 0 250 0 231 0 80 0 99 0 
Canada 175 0 135 0 117 0 1,047 1 990 1 1,192 1 977 1 314 0 903 1 
Canada/South 
America 118 0 163 0 172 0 812 1 939 1 1,395 1 1,283 1 627 1 1,194 1 
California   0   0   0   0 860 1 926 1 965 1 1,011 1 1,051 1 
Gulf of Mexico   0   0   0   0 307 0 325 0 333 0 294 0 435 0 
Alaska 1,311 1 1,285 1 1,220 1 1,202 1 1,335 1 1,356 1 1,505 1 1,536 2 1,553 2 
Lower 48 698 1 649 1 685 1 726 1 308 0 295 0 170 0 170 0 186 0 
Atlantic basin 9 0 10 0 10 0 13 0 14 0 15 0 18 0 11 0 10 0 
Other 728 1 642 1 605 1 575 1 903 1 1,015 1 1,179 1 1,188 1 1,690 2 
CENTRAL & 
SOUTH AMERICA 11,506 10 11,402 10 10,926 10 9,818 9 10,122 10 10,104 9 10,274 10 10,891 12 10,987 12 
Brazil 10,411 9 10,379 9 9,919 9 8,716 8 9,139 9 9,002 8 9,034 8 9,243 10 9,051 10 
Argentina 584 1 532 0 539 0 581 1 619 1 676 1 774 1 1,066 1 1,208 1 
Central/South 
America 415 0 401 0 373 0 432 0 151 0 200 0 281 0 372 0 414 0 
Latin America 96 0 90 0 95 0 89 0 214 0 226 0 50 0 67 0 152 0 
Ecuador   0   0   0   0   0   0 135 0 143 0 162 0 
AFRICA 9,054 8 9,949 9 10,165 9 10,302 10 10,295 10 11,107 10 11,417 11 12,075 14 13,037 14 
Africa 6,875 6 7,551 7 7,792 7 8,102 8 7,972 8 8,562 8 8,779 8 9,460 11 10,268 11 
Middle East/Africa 441 0 523 0 562 1 444 0 721 1 777 1 741 1 600 1 651 1 
North Africa 1,068 1 1,125 1 1,041 1 973 1 878 1 982 1 961 1 967 1 1,080 1 
West Africa 670 1 750 1 770 1 783 1 725 1 786 1 936 1 1,047 1 1,038 1 
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  Oil - million of barrels (cont.) 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
  Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % 
EURASIA 13,770 12 13,897 13 14,272 13 15,190 15 16,969 16 18,065 17 18,077 17 17,799 20 17,419 19 
Russia  12,786 11 12,654 12 13,054 12 13,838 13 15,191 14 15,183 14 15,366 14 15,252 17 15,318 16 
Russia/Caspian   0   0   0   0 117 0 907 1 897 1 905 1 850 1 
Kazakhstan 653 1 788 1 849 1 911 1   0   0 43 0 45 0 49 0 
Caspian Area   0   0   0   0 753 1 893 1 778 1 799 1   0 
Middle East/Russia 217 0 285 0 232 0 263 0 908 1 1,082 1 993 1 798 1 1,202 1 
Rest of Eurasia 114 0 170 0 137 0 178 0   0   0   0   0   0 
ASIA & OCEANIA 5,594 5 6,446 6 6,392 6 6,775 7 4,382 4 3,731 3 4,471 4 4,563 5 4,988 5 
Asia Pacific/Middle 
East 2,254 2 2,646 2 2,675 2 3,035 3 2,307 2 1,625 2 856 1 931 1 1,058 1 
Asia - Pacific 1,104 1 1,493 1 1,231 1 1,069 1 1,283 1 1,401 1 1,441 1 1,326 1 1,526 2 
Indonesia   0   0   0   0 439 0 576 1 579 1 698 1 807 1 
Asia 1,707 2 1,820 2 1,965 2 2,252 2 119 0 107 0 117 0 145 0 158 0 
Bohai Bay   0   0   0   0   0   0 920 1 975 1 990 1 
China Sea   0   0   0   0   0   0 537 1 481 1 446 0 
Oceania 194 0 95 0 103 0 89 0 21 0 21 0 21 0 8 0 3 0 
Australia 335 0 392 0 418 0 330 0 213 0   0   0   0   0 
EUROPE 5,769 5 5,452 5 5,417 5 5,531 5 7,105 7 7,571 7 8,441 8 8,157 9 8,478 9 
Europe 3,535 3 3,344 3 3,177 3 3,281 3 3,506 3 3,767 3 4,302 4 4,637 5 5,074 5 
Norway 1,369 1 1,241 1 1,351 1 1,396 1 1,696 2 1,760 2 1,923 2 1,150 1 1,243 1 
Italy 259 0 248 0 233 0 186 0 215 0 215 0 228 0 225 0 252 0 
North Sea   0   0   0   0 345 0 386 0 433 0 450 1 529 1 
United Kingdom 165 0 151 0 172 0 159 0 728 1 796 1 871 1 969 1 1,261 1 
Spain   0   0   0   0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 
Germany   0   0   0   0 48 0 43 0 47 0 45 0 50 0 
Netherlands   0   0   0   0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Austria 47 0 48 0 51 0 51 0 56 0 56 0 55 0 60 0 63 0 
Romania 395 0 419 0 434 0 457 0 508 0 544 1 578 1 617 1   0 
OTHERS 56,420 51 53,556 49 53,318 49 45,595 44 43,311 41 42,867 40 39,735 37 21,554 24 22,543 24 
TOTAL 111,272 100 109,726 100 108,926 100 103,365 100 105,586 100 107,727 100 107,000 100 88,449 100 93,191 100 
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Table 4.5.2 Top Companies’ Total Natural Gas Reported Reserves by Region 
  Natural Gas - bcf 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
  Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % 
NORTH AMERICA 75,958 7 73,979 7 56,817 5 60,470 6 86,913 9 86,801 8 82,952 9 78,641 24 79,360 24 
United States 44,527 4 42,673 4 26,282 3 27,665 3 40,972 4 38,895 4 40,835 4 37,616 11 36,184 11 
North America 4,120 0 3,918 0 3,711 0 2,852 0 45 0 52 0 224 0 280 0 466 0 
Canada 8,720 1 8,603 1 7,645 1 10,461 1 10,130 1 10,338 1 7,487 1 6,799 2 6,298 2 
Canada/South 
America 835 0 1,258 0 1,368 0 1,383 0 1,559 0 1,984 0 2,324 0 1,883 1 2,341 1 
California   0   0   0   0 317 0 310 0 304 0 314 0 323 0 
Gulf of Mexico   0   0   0   0 943 0 1,094 0 1,171 0 1,064 0 1,841 1 
Alaska 2,960 0 2,862 0 2,780 0 2,488 0 3,431 0 3,414 0 3,472 0 3,344 1 2,922 1 
Lower 48 7,188 1 7,617 1 7,962 1 8,423 1 9,203 1 9,027 1 4,114 0 4,234 1 4,258 1 
Atlantic basin 4,402 0 4,237 0 4,330 0 4,135 0 4,562 0 4,615 0 4,547 0 4,472 1 4,167 1 
Other 3,206 0 2,811 0 2,739 0 3,063 0 15,751 2 17,072 2 18,474 2 18,635 6 20,560 6 
CENTRAL&SOUTH 
AMERICA 18,867 2 18,390 2 17,566 2 19,209 2 18,318 2 18,148 2 21,238 2 22,048 7 23,198 7 
Brazil 11,067 1 10,554 1 9,859 1 9,346 1 10,078 1 9,427 1 9,264 1 7,954 2 8,111 2 
Argentina 2,397 0 2,578 0 2,719 0 3,145 0 3,754 0 4,081 0 4,772 1 5,867 2 6,695 2 
Central/South 
America 5,370 0 5,202 0 4,935 0 6,655 1 4,278 0 4,446 0 7,203 1 8,227 2 8,391 2 
Latin America 33 0 56 0 53 0 63 0 208 0 194 0   0   0   0 
Ecuador   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
AFRICA 23,629 2 24,341 2 24,112 2 22,785 2 25,453 2 26,025 3 26,156 3 25,817 8 22,359 7 
Africa 13,382 1 13,828 1 13,763 1 13,042 1 15,480 2 15,792 2 15,809 2 15,546 5 13,084 4 
Middle East/Africa 1,925 0 2,048 0 2,175 0 1,236 0 2,100 0 2,360 0 2,266 0 2,112 1 2,153 1 
North Africa 6,373 1 6,338 1 6,047 1 6,423 1 5,751 1 5,946 1 6,117 1 6,432 2 5,467 2 
West Africa 1,949 0 2,127 0 2,127 0 2,084 0 2,122 0 1,927 0 1,965 0 1,727 1 1,656 0 
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  Natural Gas – bcf (cont.) 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
  Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % Vol. % 
EURASIA 20,746 2 21,307 2 20,994 2 27,443 3 32,065 3 38,471 4 31,394 3 29,497 9 26,249 8 
Russia  16,851 2 16,833 2 15,933 2 22,273 2 22,845 2 22,128 2 21,431 2 21,356 6 22,152 7 
Russia/Caspian   0   0   0   0 98 0 887 0 950 0 634 0 469 0 
Kazakhstan 1,648 0 1,874 0 2,139 0 2,437 0   0   0   0   0   0 
Caspian Area   0   0   0   0 1,770 0 1,874 0 1,774 0 2,124 1   0 
Middle East/Russia 1,637 0 1,965 0 2,175 0 1,906 0 7,352 1 13,582 1 7,239 1 5,383 2 3,628 1 
Rest of Eurasia 610 0 635 0 747 0 827 0   0   0   0   0   0 
ASIA & OCEANA 63,786 6 59,329 6 63,822 6 53,721 5 40,875 4 41,326 4 45,203 5 42,139 13 41,369 12 
Asia Pacific/Middle 
East 13,738 1 14,222 1 15,284 1 17,261 2 11,124 1 12,413 1 10,204 1 9,090 3 10,575 3 
Asia - Pacific 10,691 1 11,970 1 13,733 1 13,556 1 23,970 2 24,535 2 24,772 3 23,024 7 20,733 6 
Indonesia   0   0   0   0 485 0 574 0 646 0 502 0 520 0 
Asia 15,342 1 13,874 1 15,096 1 15,663 2 3,435 0 3,703 0 4,057 0 4,742 1 5,309 2 
Bohai Bay   0   0   0   0   0   0 741 0 706 0 567 0 
China Sea   0   0   0   0   0   0 4,690 1 3,940 1 3,588 1 
Oceania 6,420 1 5,312 0 5,449 1 2,652 0 104 0 101 0 93 0 134 0 78 0 
Australia 17,595 2 13,951 1 14,260 1 4,589 0 1,757 0   0   0   0   0 
EUROPE 39,969 4 40,806 4 42,097 4 44,632 4 50,809 5 58,996 6 63,481 7 60,465 18 75,677 22 
Europe 18,359 2 18,459 2 18,979 2 20,610 2 21,071 2 21,800 2 24,564 3 27,296 8 42,870 13 
Norway 15,688 1 16,343 2 16,938 2 17,581 2 18,893 2 25,558 2 26,166 3 19,604 6 20,651 6 
Italy 2,491 0 2,644 0 2,704 0 2,844 0 3,057 0 3,391 0 3,676 0 3,818 1 4,166 1 
North Sea   0   0   0   0 1,558 0 1,697 0 1,864 0 2,051 1 2,223 1 
United Kingdom 936 0 862 0 930 0 1,020 0 3,626 0 3,861 0 4,410 0 4,720 1 5,233 2 
Spain   0   0   0   0   0   0 1 0   0   0 
Austria 382 0 415 0 444 0 494 0 521 0 544 0 572 0 530 0 534 0 
Romania 2,113 0 2,084 0 2,102 0 2,083 0 2,084 0 2,144 0 2,228 0 2,446 1   0 
OTHERS 835,458 77 825,268 78 812,814 78 794,573 78 764,627 75 753,524 74 666,972 71 72,911 22 68,698 20 
TOTAL 1,078,412 100 1,063,419 100 1,038,221 100 1,022,832 100 1,019,061 100 1,023,291 100 937,396 100 331,517 100 336,910 100 
 
